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1.1. 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian :financial crisis began on February 5, 1997 in Thailand when 
Somprasong Land, a property developer in Thailand, declared that it had not made a 
scheduled US $ 3.1 million interest payment on a US $ 80 billion Eurobond loan. Two 
weeks later, Finance One, Thailand's biggest :financial institution declared bankruptcy. 
These two shocking announcements caused the Baht (Thailand's currency) to become 
unstable, and it depreciated greatly against the US dollar. 
1 
The Thailand government tried to stabilize the Baht as they had before, but failed 
to be able to peg the Baht at an exchange rate of around 25 Baht per US dollar. 
Officially, on July 2, 1997, Bank of Thailand (BOT) on behalf of the Thailand 
government allowed the Baht to float freely against the US dollar. The Baht decreased 
20 percent in one day. As the Baht declined, Thailand's debt bomb exploded. This time 
the Baht' s drop triggered and dispersed quickly as the financial crisis spread to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines. By October 1997, the crisis hit the Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, and China. The crisis was labeled "The Asian Financial Crisis." 
2 
During the crisis time in 1997-1998, countries confronted their first trouble with 
the loss of the value of their currencies against the US dollar. Many lost 40 percent of the 
value of their currencies, and nearly 70 percent of the value of their domestic stock 
markets. 
Big exchange rate devaluations occurred throughout the crisis (Table 1.1. ). 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) were the countries most 
affected by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Indonesia's currency, Rupiah, was 
devaluated from 2,362.9 per US dollar on January 3, 1997 to 14,555 per US dollar on 
January 23, 1998. The Thai Baht declined from 25. 7 per US dollar on January 3, 1997 to 
53.2 on January 9, 1998; and the Republic of Korea's Won declined from 841.3 per US 
dollar on January 3, 1997 to 1,822.7 per US dollar on December 24, 1997 (Figures 1.1.; 
1.2.; and 1.3.). 
The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis was Asia's worst economic turn down in the 
last 30 years. Before the crisis, Southeast Asian countries had enjoyed excellent 
economic accomplishment. In a short time period in 1997-1998, the Asian fmancial 
crisis caused sharp real exchange rate depreciation. The stock market value declined 
which brought about lower economic growth in Southeast Asian countries (Tables 1.2. 
and 1.3.). Consequences of the crisis included cuts in demand for imported goods, fewer 
exports, less private and government spending, the poverty rate increased (Table 1.4. ), 
firms reduced production, and huge layoffs increased unemployment (Table 1.5.). All of 
these things defme a recession. 
3 
Table 1.1. Exchanges Rate for Selected Asian Economies, 1997-1998 
Date Indonesia Malaysia Philippine Thailand Hong Kong Japan South Singapore 
(Rupiah) (Ringgit) (Peso) (Baht) (Dollar) (Yen) Korea (Dollar) 
(Won) 
Jan3,97 2,362.9 2.52 26.25 25.7 7.74 116.32 841.3 1.40 
Jan 31, 97 2,371.2 2.49 26.33 25.9 7.75 121.20 863.l 1.41 
Feb 28, 97 2,391.4 2.48 26.31 25.8 7.74 120.82 862.1 1.42 
Mar27,97 2,396.2 2.48 26.34 26.0 7.75 123.62 892.0 1.45 
Apr 25, 97 2,429.9 2.51 26.35 26.1 7.74 126.04 890.7 1.44 
May30,97 2,430.4 2.51 26.35 24.9 7.75 116.43 889.7 1.43 
Jun27,97 2,430.9 2.52 26.35 24.0 7.75 114.72 885.9 1.43 
Jul4,97 2,432.3 2.52 26.40 28.4 7.74 113.85 887.2 1.44 
Jul 11, 97 2,439.3 2.50 27.00 29.6 7.75 113.92 888.2 1.44 
Jul 18, 97 2,515.0 2.64 27.99 30.2 7.75 115.39 893.0 1.47 
Jul 25, 97 2,603.6 2.64 28.50 31.9 7.74 116.77 890.1 1.47 
Aug 1,97 2,620.9 2.64 28.90 32.1 7.74 118.40 887.6 1.48 
Aug8,97 2,604.3 2.69 28.30 30.9 7.74 114.91 892.7 1.48 
Aug 15, 97 2,850.1 2.78 29.60 31.8 7.74 117.72 893.0 1.52 
Aug22,97 2,678.0 2.77 29.60 33.5 7.74 117.01 898.l 1.49 
Aug29,97 2,943.6 2.92 30.10 34.0 7.75 120.74 899.9 1.51 
Sep 5, 97 2,916.5 2.94 31.79 34.8 7.75 120.93 904.0 1.52 
Sep 12, 97 2,925.9 2.97 32.00 35.3 7.74 121.05 907.0 1.51 
Sep 19, 97 2,960.7 · 3.03 33.19 35.7 7.74 122.04 912.1 1.52 
Sep 26, 97. 3,085.7 3.14 33.31 34.7 7.74 120.74 912.7 1.52 
Oct 3, 97 3,716.8 3.37 34.60 35.4 7.74 121.91 911.9 1.54 
Oct 10, 97 3,392.8 3.11 32.89 35.7 7.74 119.93 912.8 1.54 
Oct 17, 97 3,561.8 3.24 33.50 37.1 7.74 120.20 913.0 1.55 
Oct24, 97 3,534.7 3.39 35.00 38.7 7.73 121.96 927.1 1.55 
Oct3l,97 3,579.4 3.34 35.00 40.0 7.73 120.34 960.0 1.57 
Nov7,97 3,283.9 3.30 34.60 38.3 7.73 124.18 . 974.7 1.57 
Nov 14,97 3,432.4 3.31 33.60 38.3 7.73 126.91 982.3 1.58 
Nov21,97 3,541.7 3.42 34.00 38.7 7.73 125.82 1,051.0 1.58 
Nov28,97 3,645.9 3.50 34.65 40.6 7.73 127.62 1,169.0 1.60 
Dec 5, 97 4,012.0 3.75 34.90 41.4 7.74 130.16 1,228.0 1.62 
Dec 12, 97 4,972.4 3.81 37.71 45.0 7.75 130.46 1,704.8 1.65 
Dec 19, 97 4,987.5 3.82 39.00 44.7 7.75 129.00 1,576.5 1.67 
Dec24,97 5,611.6 3.82 39.70 45.2 7.75 129.88 1,822.7 1.67 
Jan2,98 5,985.0 3.95 40.80 48.0 7.75 132.44 1,695.5 1.69 
Jan 9, 98 8,643.9 4.60 43.90 53 .. 2 7.75 131.59 1,811.5 1.77 
Jan 16, 98 8,502.9 4.18 41.21 51.7 7.74 129.16 1,608.7 1.73 
Jan 23, 98 14,555.0 4.55 43.61 53.7 7.75 126.00 1,764.6 1.77 
Jan 30, 98 10,398.0 4.16 42.49 52.7 7.74 126.97 1,514.6 1.71 
Feb 5, 98 9,599.0 3.93 40.34 48.5 7.74 123.63 1,597.4 1.66 
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Figure 1.3. Thailand Exchange Rate in Baht per US 
Dollar from January 3, 1997 to February 
5, 1998 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
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Table 1.2. Annual Growth of Key Economies of Asian Countries, 1995-1999 
Country, Key Economies 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 
...... Percent ...... 
Indonesia 
GDP 8.2** 8.o** 2.2·· -13.0 0.3 
GNP Per capita -17.8 0.4 
Export na 9.7*** 7.3*** 11.2 -31.6 
Agriculture -0.7 2.1 
Industry -14.0 1.2 
Services -16.4 -1.4 
Private Consumption -6.3 3.7 
Gov. Consumption -15.4 0.7 
Gross Domestic Inv. -34.6 -20.0 
Imports -5.3 -40.7 
Domestic Consumer Prices 58.5 20.5 
Implicit GDP Deflator 81.2 12.8 
South Korea 
GDP 9.o** 7.1** 5.5** -6.7 10.7 
GNP Per capita -8.4 IO.I 
Export na 3.1··· 5.o··· 13.2 16.3 
Agriculture -6.6 4.7 
Industry -7.5 13.0 
Services -6.0 9.4 
Private Consumption -11.3 9.4 
Gov. Consumption -0.4 -0.6 
Gross Domestic Inv. -38.4 30.4 
Imports -22.4 28.9 
Domestic Consumer Prices 7.5 0.8 
Implicit GDP Deflator 5.1 -1.6 
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Table 1.2. Continued 
Country, Key Economies 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999• 
...... Percent ...... 
Malaysia 
GDP 9.4•• 8.6·· 1.1·· -7.4 5.8 
GNP Per capita -7.4 1.6 
Export na 5.8··· 0.1··· 0.5 13.4 
Agriculture -3.3 3.3 
Industry -10.9 8.0 
Services -4.7 4.3 
Private Consumption -10.8 3.1 
Gov. Consumption -6.6 16.3 
Gross Domestic Inv. -43.0 -5.1 
Imports · -18.8 10.8 
Domestic Consumer Prices 5.3 2.8 
Implicit GDP Deflator 9.0 -0.2 
Philippines 
GDP na na na -0.8 3.2 
GNP Per capita -2.0 1.3 
Export na 16.7*** 22.9••• -21.0 3.6 
Agriculture -7.3 6.2 
Industry -2.1 0.3 
Services 3.5 4.1 
Private Consumption 6.9 0.4 
Gov. Consumption -1.9 5.3 
Gross Domestic Inv. -16.3 -2.9 
Imports -14.7 -2.8 
Domestic Consumer Prices 9.8 6.6 
Implicit GDP Deflator 11.3 8.2 
Table 1.2. Continued 
Country, Key Economies 
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Table 1.3. The Effect of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis in Gross 







Source: Jackson, 1999 
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Table 1.4. Increased Poverty Due to the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia, 
Thailand, and South Korea (1998 Forecast) 
Country 1998 Forecast 
Increase in the Number of Due to Unemployment Due to Inflation 
Poor 
(Millions) %of (Millions) % of Total (Millions) % of Total 
Population Increase Increase 
Indonesia 39.9 20.0 12.3 30.8 27.6 69.2 
South 5.5 12.0 4.7 85.5 0.8 14.5 
Korea 
Thailand 6.7 12.0 5.4 80.6 1.3 19.4 
Source: Lee, 1998 
Table 1.5. Number of Unemployment before and after the 1997-1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong 
Country Pre Crisis 1997 Post Crisis 
(Estimate and Forecast) 
Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Absolute Unemployment 
(000) Rate (000) Increases Rate 
(%) (000) (%) 
Indonesia 4,300 4.9 9,300to 13,700 5,000 to 9,400 7.2 to 14.8 
Thailand 698 2.2 1,987 1,289 6.0 
Malaysia 224 2.6 405 181 5.2 
Hong 77 2.4 152 75 4.6 
Kon 
Source: Lee, 1998 
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Many analysts have studied the root cause of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Lee (1998) suggested the origins of the crisis included crony capitalism and corruption, 
subversion of democracy, subversion of the law, social injustice and the failure of the 
Asian model to follow principles of free market economics. Give away privatizations to 
relatives and cronies of the political leadership were common. Artificial monopoly 
rights were granted. Government directed credit toward political allies, which resuhed in 
misallocations of capital and a lower return on capital. Corruption, lack of transparency 
in economic management, and excess interventionism are common in the government. 
Jackson (1999) suggested that the excessive borrowing from abroad, especially by 
the private sector, is the hallmark of the crisis. Five years before the crisis, the 
borrowings of banks and non-banks had grown rapidly. Total external indebtedness 
reached US$ 43.74 billion in Thailand, and US$ 34.71 billion in Indonesia (Table 1.6.). 
Other possible causes of the crisis were fixed exchange rates that were used across the 
region by governments to minimize the foreign exchange rate variation for domestic 
borrowers and foreign investors which resulted in overvalued currencies. Inadequate 
supervisory institutions, poor investment decisions, weak banks, real estate speculation, 
and political uncertainty are other factors contributing to the crisis. 
To stabilize its financial systems, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand have 
received funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thailand asked for 
US $ 17 .2 billion from International Monetary Fund (IMF) in August 1997. In Octo her 
1997, Indonesia requested US $ 40 billion from IMF. The IMF requested some reforms 
from the Indonesian government to eliminate subsidies and tax breaks to monopolies. In 
November 1997, South Korea requested IMF aid of US$ 57 billion (Table 1.7.). The 
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Table 1.6. The Short Term Debt of the Asian Countries (US$ Billions) 
Year Thailand Indonesia South Malaysia Philippines Singapore Hong China 
Korea Kong 
...... US $ Billions ...... 
1995 60.56 25.97 47.63 7.27 5.28 1.22 7.85 34.40 
1996 58.33 32.23 54.66 11.07 7.97 2.00 14.26 38.09 
1997 43.74 34.71 59.65* I0.21 8.45* 2.00* 15.02* 43.81* 
1998** 33.68 30.19 28.19 9.75 7.95 2.00 14.84 48.63 
1999** 34.92 31.39 23.02 IO.IO 8.25 2.10 14.79 54.46 
Note: * = estimate 
** = forecast 
Source: Lee, 1998 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) asked the South Korea government to apply free 
market reforms including opening its market for foreign investment and ownership. 
1.2. Problems 
15 
Social disruptions and unrest, decreases in output, decreases in income, massive 
job losses (due to :further bankruptcies and cutbacks in production), and increased 
inflation became even more alarming as the crisis progressed (Lee, 1998). Increasing 
food prices became major issues in South Asian countries, as shown in Table 1.2., which 
Indonesia's annual domestic growth in consumer prices in 1998 was 58.5 percent while it 
was 5 .3 percent for Malaysia. 
Palm oil is one of the nine essential commodities in Indonesia. It is an important 
source for cooking oil in Indonesia and Malaysia. Palm oil became an important policy 
focus, as its prices increased 80 percent to 134 percent between July 1997 and April 1998 
in Indonesia (Table 1.8. and Figure 1.4.). In some oflndonesia's regions during the 
crisis, the cooking oil price increased from 1,678 Rupiah per kilogram to 7,655 Rupiah 
per kilogram. In Indonesia, the increasing price of cooking oil, rice and other essential 
commodities caused social turmoil and unrest. To calm the social situation in Indonesia, 
the Indonesian government intervened in the domestic cooking oil industry. The 
government set policies in the palm oil and palm kernel oil industry to decrease and 
control the cooking oil price, and to make sure the quantity of cooking oil needed was 
available in the market. During the crisis, a range of export tariff rates, and export 
controls in palm oil and palm kernel oil industry were applied. A key issue is whether 
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Table 1.8. Price Increase of the Nine Essential Commodities in Indonesia, July 1997 -
April 1998 
Commodity Java Island Non Java Island 
...... Percent ..... . 
Rice 50 37 
Salted Fish 56 42 
Palm Oil 134 80 
Granulated sugar 36 31 
Salt 66 32 
Kerosene 8 6 
Washing soap 77 72 
Textiles 38 39 
Batiks 25 30 
General 51 39 
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the policies helped control prices of cooking oil in Indonesia. Different from Indonesia, 
during the crisis, the prices of cooking oil in Malaysia were stable. Because of its 
stability, the Malaysian government did not intrude its cooking oil, palm oil and palm 
kernel oil industries. 
Indonesia is the world's second largest producer of palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products following Malaysia. Consequently, Malaysia will take the best actions to 
expand and maintain its palm oil and palm kernel oil industry, and market its products 
based on the policies of the Indonesian government did in its palm oil and palm kernel oil 
industry/market. 
1.3. Obiectives 
The objectives of this research are: 
1. To describe the world palm oil and palm kernel oil industry from 1997 to 1999 and 
the condition of palm oil and palm kernel oil industry in Indonesia and Malaysia 
during, and after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. 
2. To describe the political and economic policies that were applied by the Indonesian 
and Malaysian government to handle the crisis particularly in their palm oil and palm 
kernel oil industry in 1997 to 1999. 
3. To determine the impact of 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis on palm oil and palm 
kernel oil industry in Indonesia and Malaysia by evaluating the effect oflndonesian 
palm oil and palm kernel oil policies on palm oil and palm kernel oil prices in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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1.4. Organization of the Study 
The study includes eight chapters. Chapter two depicts the palm oil and palm 
kernel oil industries in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter three describes political and 
economic policies. Chapter four describes government policies affecting the palm oil and 
palm kernel oil industry. Chapter five describes theory and previous empirical work. 
Chapter six explains data, methodology, and empirical results and chapter seven 
describes summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
PALM OIL AND PALM KERNEL OIL INDUSTRY 
Palm oil and palm kernel oil products are an important nutritional source for 
human consumption and for industrial use. Palm oil and palm kernel oil are two of the 17 
categories of oils and fats. World opening stocks of 17 oils and fats increased from 
11,290,000 metric tons in 1994 to 12,960,000 metric tons in 1999 (Table 2.1.), which 
world average opening stocks in 1999 was 2,854,000 metric tons in palm oil and 240,500 
metric tons in palm kernel oil. World palm oil and palm kernel oil production varied, 
between 14,304,000 and 20,277,000 metric tons of palm oil from 1994 to 1999, and 
between 1,861,000 to 2,518,000 metric tons for palm kernel oil (Table 2.2.). World's 
production of palm oil increased an average of 5.5 percent per year; and 7.1 percent per 
year for palm kernel oil from 1994 to 1999. The world price of palm oil was between US 
$ 308.8 and US$ 723.8 per metric ton, which the price of palm kernel oil varied from US 
$ 580.0 to US $ 780.0 per metric ton (Figure 2.1.) 
In 1999, world imports were 13,581,000 metric tons of palm oil and 1,260,000 
metric tons of palm kernel oil, while in 1994 only 10,614,000 metric tons for palm oil 
and 896,000 metric tons of palm kernel oil were imported (Table 2.3.). World exports of 
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Table 2.1. World Opening Stock of 17 Oils and Fats (1,000 Metric Tons), 1994-1999 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Palm oil 2,910 2,265 2,881 3,139 3,250 2,679 
Palm kernel oil 272 193 210 241 263 264 
Soybean oil 2,211 2,028 2,713 2,841 2,565 2,623 
Cottonseed oil 323 356 407 394 434 386 
Groundnut oil 350 366 488 529 495 495 
Sunflower oil 989 1,091 1,187 1,343 1,244 1,204 
Rapeseed oil 719 985 1,270 1,202 1,290 1,301 
Com oil 133 126 182 154 143 154 
Coconut oil 417 428 461 401 483 584 
Olive oil 829 685 557 651 1,074 1,227 
Castor oil 68 72 85 88 70 64 
Sesame oil 45 46 48 45 46 45 
Linseed oil 75 83 92 96 86 102 
Total 9,341 8,724 10,581 11,124 11,447 11,128 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 819 688 663 670 593 600 
Tallow 542 555 613 493 576 590 
Fish oil 261 413 310 269 223 177 
Lard 327 391 453 441 465 465 
Total 1,949 2,047 2,039 1,873 1,857 1,832 
Grand total 11,290 10,771 12,620 12,997 13,300 12,960 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.2. World Production ofl7 Oils and Fats: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Palm oil 14,304 15,447 16,643 17,861 16,711 20,277 
Palm kernel oil 1,861 1,948 2,086 2,223 2,163 2,518 
Soybean oil 18,684 20,426 20,324 21,034 24,006 24,755 
Cottonseed oil 3,566 3,901 4,127 4,045 4,048 3,811 
Groundnut oil 4,309 4,397 4,497 4,446 4,546 4,705 
Sunflower oil 7,391 8,572 9,032 9,206 8,546 9,237 
Rapeseed oil 9,970 10,952 11,486 11,841 12,220 12,936 
Com oil 1,675 1,851 1,828 1,879 1,930 1,989 
Coconut oil 3,015 3,350 2,867 3,321 3,205 2,499 
Olive oil 1,900 1,888 2,042 2,682 2,581 2,425 
Castor oil 446 483 479 453 438 433 
Sesame oil 616 589 642 692 724 689 
Linseed oil 636 701 662 678 697 721 
Total 68,373 74,505 76,715 80,361 81,815 86,995 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 5,677 5,717 5,678 5,697 5,744 5,819 
Tallow 7,550 7,510 7,417 7,490 7,737 8,133 
Fish oil 1,490 1,318 1,368 1,214 849 1,201 
Lard 5,430 5,689 5,911 6,032 6,469 6,609 
Total 20,147 20,234 20,374 20,433 20,799 21,762 
Grand total 88,520 94,739 97,089 100,794 102,614 108,757 
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Table 2.3. World Import of 17 Oils and Fats: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Palm oil 10,614 10,341 10,717 12,052 11,160 13,581 
Palm kernel oil 896 796 930 1,032 1,059 1,260 
Soybean oil 4,693 5,439 5,175 6,877 7,739 7,702 
Cottonseed oil 232 282 236 233 215 166 
Groundnut oil 269 262 232 253 252 228 
Sunflower oil 2,006 2,995 2,618 3,414 2,801 2,953 
Rapeseed oil 1,778 1,897 1,859 1,898 2,208 1,795 
Com oil 484 631 613 685 805 689 
Coconut oil 1,571 1,653 1,406 1,832 1,955 1,174 
Olive oil 443 405 318 506 475 574 
Castor oil 196 296 259 238 243 231 
Sesame oil 23 22 22 23 21 25 
Linseed oil 132 191 128 135 116 131 
Total 23,337 25,210 24,513 29,178 29,049 30,509 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 629 610 549 629 602 588 
Tallow 2,254 2,570 2,176 1,990 2,340 2,318 
Fish oil 789 906 786 716 421 690 
Lard 170 182 141 152 165 214 
Total 3,842 4,268 3,652 3,487 3,528 3,810 
Grand total 27,179 29,478 28,165 32,665 32,577 34,319 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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palm oil and palm kernel oil increased by 26.5 percent from 1994 to 1999 (Table 2.4.), of 
which world palm oil export increased from 10,760,000 metric tons to 13,527,000 metric 
tons, and volume of palm kernel oil increased from 890,000 metric tons to 1,213,000 
metric tons. 
World palm oil and palm kernel oil disappearance increased from 14,803,000 
metric tons of palm oil in 1994 to 19,415,000 metric tons in 1999, and from 1,946,000 
metric tons to 2,554,000 metric tons for palm kernel oil (Table 2.5.). The world ending 
stocks of palm oil was between 2,265,000 and 3,595,000 metric tons while palm kernel 
oil stocks ranged from 193,000 to 275,000 metric tons (Table 2.6.). 
Malaysia and Indonesia are the world's first and second largest producers and 
exporters of palm oil and palm kernel oil. In 1999, Malaysia produced 10,554,000 metric 
tons of palm oil, a 46.2 percent increase from production from 1994, while Indonesia 
produced 6,060,000 metric tons a 51.2 percent increase since 1994 (Table 2.7.). 
Combined, Indonesia and Malaysia produced 82 percent of the world palm oil in 1999. 
In 1999, 8,802,000 metric tons of palm oil was exported by Malaysia (Table 2.8.), 
which was 83.4 percent of its production, and Indonesia exported 52.5 percent of its 
production (3,183,000 metric tons). Europe was the major importer of palm oil followed 
by China and India (Table 2.9.). 
2.1. Palm Oil Tree 
Palm oil trees (Elaeis Guinnesis) are a perennial crop and were found first in West 
Africa. The trees were planted in other parts of Africa, South East Asia, and Latin 
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Table 2.4. World Export of 17 Oils and Fats: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Palm oil 10,760 10,173 10,715 12,117 10,812 13,527 
Palm kernel oil 890 793 930 1,048 1,007 1,213 
Soybean oil 4,786 5,691 4,951 6,773 7,986 7,545 
Cottonseed oil 254 272 230 230 227 155 
Groundnut oil 253 266 238 251 254 243 
Sunflower oil 1,996 2,962 2,651 3,380 2,781 2,981 
Rapeseed oil 1,852 1,898 1,780 1,907 2,222 1,682 
Com oil 504 598 592 692 799 658 
Coconut oil 1,481 1,704 1,390 1,921 1,857 1,104 
Olive oil 443 385 305 512 483 568 
Castor oil 188 302 263 230 245 235 
Sesame oil 23 22 23 23 22 22 
Linseed oil 122 188 138 130 120 136 
Total 23,552 25,254 24,206 29,214 28,815 30,069 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 628 574 549 632 583 593 
Tallow 2,254 2,553 2,148 1,994 2,331 2,289 
Fish oil 823 895 771 739 429 685 
Lard 179 179 146 143 160 208 
Total 3,884 4,201 3,614 3,508 3,503 3,775 
Grand total 27,436 29,455 27,820 32,722 32,318 33,844 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.5. Disappearance of 17 Oils and Fats from the World Market: 1994-1999 (1,000 
Metric Tons) 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Pahn oil 14,803 14,999 16,387 17,685 17,630 19,415 
Palm kernel oil 1,946 1,934 2,055 2,185 2,214 2,554 
Soybean oil 18,774 19,489 20,420 21,414 23,701 24,619 
Cottonseed oil 3,511 3,860 4,146 4,008 4,084 3,820 
Groundnut oil 4,309 4,271 4,450 4,482 4,544 4,725 
Sunflower oil 7,299 8,509 8,843 9,339 8,606 9,155 
Rapeseed oil 9,630 10,666 11,633 11,744 12,195 12,917 
Com oil 1,662 1,828 1,877 1,883 1,925 1,988 
Coconut oil 3,094 3,266 2,943 3,150 3,202 2,804 
Olive oil 2,044 2,036 1,961 2;253 2,420 2,436 
Castor oil 450 464 472 479 442 428 
Sesame oil 615 587 644 691 724 689 
Linseed oil 638 695 648 693 677 703 
Total 68,775 72,604 76,479 80,006 82,364 86,253 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 5,809 5,778 5,671 5,771 5,756 5,802 
Tallow 7,537 7,469 7,565 7,403 7,732 8,188 
Fish oil 1,304 1,432 1,424 1,237 887 1,159 
Lard 5,357 5,630 5,918 6,017 6,474 6,637 
Total 20,007 20,309 20,578 20,428 20,849 21,78-6 
Grand total 88,782 92,913 97,057 100,434 103,213 108,039 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.6. World Ending Stock of 17 Oils and Fats: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Oils/Fats 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Vegetable Oils 
Palm oil 2,265 2,881 3,139 3,250 2,679 3,595 
Palm kernel oil 193 210 241 263 264 275 
Soybean oil 2,028 2,713 2,841 2,565 2,623 2,916 
Cottonseed oil 356 407 394 434 386 388 
Groundnut oil 366 488 529 495 495 460 
Sunflower oil 1,091 1,187 1,343 1,244 1,204 1,258 
Rapeseed oil 985 1,270 1,202 1,290 1,301 1,433 
Com oil 126 182 154 143 154 186 
Coconut oil 428 461 401 483 584 349 
Olive oil 685 557 651 1,074 1,227 1,222 
Castor oil 72 85 88 70 64 65 
Sesame oil 46 48 45 46 45 48 
Linseed oil 83 92 96 86 102 115 
Total 8,724 10,581 11,124 11,443 11,128 12,310 
Animal oils/fats 
Butter 688 663 670 593 600 612 
Tallow 555 613 493 576 590 564 
Fish oil 413 310 269 223 177 224 
Lard 391 453 441 465 465 443 
Total 2,047 2,039 1,873 1,857 1,832 1,843 
Grand total 10,771 12,620 12,997 13,300 12,960 14,153 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.7. World's Major Producers of Palm Oil: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Malaysia 7,221 7,811 8,386 9,069 8,320 10,554 
Indonesia 4,008 4,480 4,899 5,385 5,006 6,060 
Nigeria 640 660 670 680 690 720 
Colombia 353 387 410 441 500 424 
Cote D'Ivoire 300 285 280 240 275 282 
Thailand 316 354 375 390 355 410 
Papua New Guinea 225 223 272 275 215 270 
Equador 178 180 188 203 200 220 
Costa Rica 90 97 109 109 103 105 
Honduras 76 76 76 77 74 75 
Brazil 71 76 80 80 89 90 
Venezuela 34 44 45 46 48 46 
Guatemala 22 25 36 50 51 53 
Others 770 779 817 816 785 968 
TOTAL 14,304 15,477 16,643 17,861 16,711 20,277 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.8. World's Major Exporters of Palm Oil: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
Malaysia 6,750 6,513 7,212 7,490 7,425 8,802 
Indonesia 2,173 1,856 1,851 2,982 2,082 3,183 
Papua New Guinea 231 220 267 275 213 264 
Cote D'Ivoire 148 120 99 73 83 75 
Colombia 20 21 29 61 67 101 
Singapore • 328 399 289 298 241 270 
Hong Kong 
. 
234 275 305 173 103 94 
Others * 876 769 663 765 598 738 
TOTAL 10,760 10,173 10,715 12,117 10,812 13,527 
Note: * = Includes Re-exporting Countries 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.9. World's Major Importers of Palm Oil: 1994-1999 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... 000 Metric Tons ...... 
China, P.R 1,863 1,595 1,370 1,860 1,373 1,347 
Europe 1,842 1,738 1,867 2,045 2,086 2,092 
Pakistan 1,230 1,122 1,104 1,144 1,114 1,052 
Egypt 390 353 381 372 408 511 
India 408 863 1,254 1,469 1,672 3,248 
Japan 349 351 361 370 357 365 
Malaysia 205 38 15 35 92 192 
Turkey 201 201 171 240 174 188 
South Korea 201 156 184 197 151 172 
Myamnar 185 305 235 280 248 261 
USA 160 102 125 135 116 131 
· Bangladesh 124 53 109 177 93 34 
Indonesia 128 55 109 93 25 40 
South Africa 160 128 147 160 140 163 
Saudi Arabia 156 169 168 184 178 182 
Kenya 196 177 171 208 187 175 
Ex USSR 47 57 49 124 103 93 
Other Countries 2,769 2,878 2,897 2,959 2,643 3,335 
TOTAL 10,614 10,341 10,717 12,052 11,160 13,581 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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America in the middle of the 15th century (Malaysian Palm Oil Promotion Council, 
2000). Planting densities are from 136 to 160 trees per hectare. Palm fruit grow in large 
bunches that have 1,000 to 2,000 singular fruits per bunch. Each tree yields an average 
of twelve bunches per year and each bunch weighs 20 to 30 kg. 
Palm oil trees are most productive from sea level to about 300 meters; in a region 
with a rainfall of2,000 mm; with a mean maximum temperature of about 85°F to 90°F 
and a mean minimum temperature of about 72°F to 75°F; constant sunshine amounting to 
at least 5 hours per day in all months of the year (Hartley, 1977). Indonesia and Malaysia 
are the best regions for growing palm oil trees. 
Palm oil tree's mature in 3 to 5 years after planting in the field, where average 
yields could be 3.2 tons palm oil and 0.46 ton palm kernel oil per hectare per year. Palm 
oil trees can be in economic production for 25 years (Khera, 1976). 
Palm oil is extracted from the heavy mesocarp of palm fruit, which is 45 to 55 
percent oil, and palm kernel oil is the oil that is extracted from the palm :fruit's kernel 
(Figure 2.2.). Gunstone's (1978) diagram of the processes from palm oil bunches to be 
palm oil and palm kernel oil is shown in Figure 2.3. The fresh fruit bunches (FFB) from 
the field are carried by trucks to the sterilized cage by bunch loading ramps. In the 
sterilizer, fresh fruit bunches (FFB) are subjected to steam pressure to a) prevent the 
formation of free fatty acid, b) make machine stripping easier, c) condition the fruit 
pericarp for subsequent processing, d) precondition the nuts, e) deactivate hydrolytic 
enzymes that breakdown oil to free fatty acids, and f) release the fruits from the bunches 
(Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia, 2000). Fruit fresh bunches (FFB) are 
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Figure 2.2. Cross-section of Palm Oil Fruit 
Source: Moll, 1987; 
Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia, 2000 
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Figure 2.3. Material Flowchart for Palm Oil Processing 
Source: Gunstone, 1987 
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sterilized by steam at 140° C for 75-90 minutes. Next the sterilized fresh fruit bunches 
go to the stripper. The stripper separates the sterilized fruits from the leaves and stalks, 
and expels sterilized fruit and emptied bunch stalks. Next, the sterilized fruit goes to the 
digester. Inside the digester the fruit is reheated by steam and the pericarp is loosened. 
Next, the digested fruit goes to screw press machines where crude palm oil (CPO), nuts, 
and fiber are produced. Next crude palm oil is clarified and purified by screening, 
centrifuge, and vacuum dryer steps. 
2.2. Palm Oil 
Palm oil contains 53 percent saturated fatty acids and 47 percent unsaturated fatty 
acids (Table 2.10.). More palm oil than palm kernel oil is produced. A better quality 
palm oil and advanced technology in the manufacture of margarine and cooking fat have 
allowed an increased use of palm oil in edible products. The quality of palm oil is 
defined by its free fatty acid content, contamination, and bleach ability. Poor quality 
palm oil has high free fatty acid, is contaminated with water or other impurities, and/or 
has poor bleach ability. 
Palm oil has two major products; crude palm oil (CPO) and processed palm oil 
(PPO). Refining and fractionation crude palm oil (CPO) yields processed palm oil 
(PPO). The four big products in the processed palm oil (PPO) category, as explained in 
Figure 2.4., are: 1) refined bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD Palm Oil); 2) refmed 
bleached deodorized palm stearin (RBD Palm Stearin); 3) refined bleached deodorized 
palm olein (RBD Palm Olein); and 4) palm fatty acid distillate (PF AD). Other processed 
palm oil (PPO) products are listed in Appendix Table A-1. 
Table 2.10. Composition of Palm Oil 










Source: Moll, 1987 
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Figure 2.4. Chart Showing the Utilization of Palm Oil and Palm 
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2.3. Palm Kernel Oil 
Palm kernel oil is distinguished from palm oil by its physical and chemical 
properties. Palm kernel oil contains 82 percent saturated fatty acids and 18 percent 
unsaturated fatty acids (Table 2.11.). The quality of palm kernel oil is established by 
39 
free fatty acid content, color, and bleach ability. High quality palm kernel oil has low 
fatty acid content, a light yellow color, and it is easily bleached. Palm kernel oil has three 
categories of products. They are crnde palm kernel oil (CPKO), processed palm kernel 
oil (PPKO), and palm kernel cake (PKC) (Figure 2.4.). The products that are put in to 
processed palm kernel oil (PPKO) category are ::.iated in Appendix Table A-2. 
2.4. Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil Industries 
Production of palm oil and palm kernel oil in the world have been increasing 
every year. Causes for the dynamic growth in oil palm production include (Gunstone, 
1987): 
1) Policy of diversification. 
This policy was proposed to reduce Indonesia's dependence on petroleum as a source 
of foreign exchange earnings. Based on the information that petroleum export would 
decrease in the future, the alternative income from expanded palm oil and palm kernel 
oil industries would be desirable. 
2) An improvement in palm oil tree varieties, cultivation, and processing technology. 
New palm varieties that yield products early and have higher yields per hectare 
have been developed. 
Table 2.11. Composition of Palm Kernel Oil 












Source: Moll, 1987 













3) High profitability of palm oil growing relative to competing products. 
A West Malaysian study revealed that with palm oil prices ofM$ 700 to M$ 850 per 
metric ton, freight on board (FOB) mill and 18.5 ton fresh fruit bunch yield, the profit 
per hectare was M$ 1,100 to M$ 1,695 contrasted with M$ 340 to M$ 860 for rubber 
at price M cents 200 to 265 per kilogram; 
4) Ample availability land suitable for oil palm growing such as in Indonesia; 
5) The firmness of the US dollar. 
The firmness of the US dollar could slow the world's consumption of other 
oilseeds from the US (soybean oil), and cause substitution of palm oil. Importing 
countries that are counting on imports of soybean oil and/or its products face home 
currency price increases when their currency depreciates relative to the US dollar. 
World soybean oil consumption would be expected to decrease which may cause 
world soybean production to decrease. Consequently, palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products may substitute for soybean oil. 
2.5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Palm Oil Product 
Advantages of palm oil include: 1) Natural coloring materials in palm 
oil can provide a colorant (for margarine and yellow fat); 2) A high solid glyceride 
content in palm oil gives consistency without hydrogenation; 3) Low linoleic and linoleic 
acid content in palm oil give good heat stability and provide excellent resistance to 
rancidity which in term means palm oil is an excellent deep frying medium; 4) A low 
level of triglycerides in palm oil minimizes the development of off-flavor from microbial 
action; 5) Palm oil has some industrial application for food uses (shortening, margarine, 
frying fats, ice cream, cookies, dough fat, biscuits, non dairy creamer, instant noodles, 
icing, cake mixes, and crackers). 
Other advantages of oil palm products include (Malaysian Palm Oil Promotion 
Council, 2000): 
1) Palm oil is a natural source of the antioxidants vitamin E, tocopherol, and 
tocotrienols; 
2) Palm oil is a very rich source of beta-carotene, which is an important source of 
vitamin A; 
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3) Palm oil contains a much higher proportion of palmitic acids. Higher palmitic acids 
are needed by the cake and baking industries for aeration of the fat/sugar mixture 
process; and 
4) Palm oil is cholesterol free. 
However, palm oil has some disadvantages too such as: 
1) Palm oil has a high carotenoid level, which makes it difficult and costly to produce a 
low colored oil; 
2) Palm oil has a wide plastic rage and gives relatively poor melting in the mouth; and 
3) Palm oil's free fatty acid content increases rapidly in overripe or damaged fruit, 
which could cause problems for storage and increase refining costs. 
2.6. Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil Industry of Indonesia 
Larson (1996) reported that, in Indonesia, palm oil trees were cultivated and frrst 
utilized for soap production in mid-nineteenth century in Central Java. Palm oil 
plantations were producing edible oil by 1911. In 1938 the area of palm oil tree was 
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90,000 ha (Moll, 1987). From 1968 to 1988, palm oil production increased partially 
because of the government investment in Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan Nusantara (PTP 
Nusantara) and the government's rural development projects for smallholders. PTP 
Nusantara is the government estate company. Smallholders expanded between 1970 and 
1988 when 2 to 4 hectare areas were opened for smallholders and planted near PTP 
Nusantara. Smallholders produce, collect and deliver the fresh fruit bunch (FFB) to PTP 
Nusantara. 
From 1988 to 1994, the most growth occurred in palm oil and palm kernel oil 
industries, through a cooperative Indonesian government and private sector arrangement 
called Pir-trans. In Pir-trans, the government is accountable for infrastructure and 
guaranteeing property rights. Private investors were given a credit for estate 
development and crop planting, and crushing facilities. Since 1994, the Indonesian 
government continued to encourage private, state-owned, and foreign companies to plant 
and expand palm oil and palm kernel oil industries in order to secure enough supply of 
palm oil and palm kernel oil products for the domestic market and to increase foreign 
exchange earnings from exports. In 1999 there were 693 palm oil plantations while in 
1995 there were only 519 (Figure 2.5.). 
In Indonesia, palm oil is a significant source of vegetable oil and cooking oil in 
the domestic market. Palm oil is the leading cooking oil domestically consumed, and 
palm oil is believed to be a crucial commodity for food security. Palm oil accounts for 80 
percent of the domestic vegetable oil consumption while coconut oil represents 11 
percent, palm kernel oil represents 7 percent, soybean oil is 0.7 percent, and peanut oil is 
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Figure 2.5. Total Number of Palm Oil Plantations, 1995-1999 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, Database 
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related to the fact that the price of domestic palm oil is lower than the domestic price of 
coconut oil (Tables 2.12. and 2.13.). 
Palm oil plantings and production have been increasing dramatically in 
Indonesia. Area planted in palm oil trees increased from 728,662 hectares in 1987 to 
2,416,449 hectares in 1997, while palm oil production increased from 1,506,055 metric 
tons to 5,356,541 metric tons (Tables 2.14. and 2.15.). Almost two-thirds of palm 
production came from private companies in 1997. Private companies controlled 46.4 
percent of the production area followed by government estates at 18.9 percent. Palm oil 
plantings can be found from West Indonesia to East Indonesia, from Sumatra to Irian 
Jaya. Sumatra is the largest palm oil plantation area harvested, with 87.8 percentage 
share of production in 1999, followed by Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, and Java 
(Figure 2.6. and Table 2.16.). As the area and palm oil production increased, the number 
of large estate companies showed the notable increases from 289 large estate companies 
in 1991 to 352 in 1995 (Table 2.17.). 
Palm oil and palm kernel oil generate foreign and domestic exchange revenue for 
Indonesia. In 1999 palm oil exports was 3,298,986.3 metric tons, 2.6 times more than 
export in 1995. The value of palm oil exports in 1999 was US$ 1,114,242.6 while in 
1995 it was only US$ 747,413.8. Volume and value export of palm kernel oil were less 
compared to palm oil; 597,842.4 metric tons of palm kernel oil were exported with a 
value of US$ 347,974.6 in 1999, almost double the volume and value of exports in 
1995 (Table 2.18.). Palm oil export prices were between US$ 275.9to US$ 635.7 per 
metric ton (Figure 2.7.). 
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Table 2.12. Average Monthly Wholesale Prices for Crude Palm Oil (CPO) in the Jakarta 
Market, Indonesia, (Rupiah I 17 kg Containers) in 1996 and 1997 
Year 
Month 1996 1997 
...... Rupiah I 17 Kg Containers ..... . 
January 19,720 17,850 
February 17,680 17,850 
March 19,465 17,850 
April 20,400 17,850 
May 20,230 20,145 
June 18,360 19,975 
July 20,230 19,720 
August 20,060 19,295 
September 20,400 19,465 
October 18,955 23,035 
November 19,380 45,390 
December 20,400 51,850 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA 
Table 2.13. Average Monthly Wholesale Prices for Coconut Oil in the Jakarta Market, 
Indonesia, (Rupiah I 17 kg Containers) in 1996 and 1997 
Year 
Month 1996 1997 
...... Rupiah I 17 Kg Containers ...... 
January 28,050 28,900 
February 29,750 28,475 
March 30,600 28,050 
April 30,600 27,200 
May 30,600 25,500 
June 30,600 23,800 
July 30,600 24,650 
August 30,600 25,500 
September 28,900 23,800 
October 28,900 25,500 
November 30,600 28,900 
December 29,750 32,300 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA 
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Table 2.15. Indonesian Palm Oil Production (Metric Tons) in 1987 - 1997 




...... Metric Tons ...... 
1987 165,162 988,480 352,413 
1988 156,148 1,102,692 454,495 
1989 183,689 1,184,226 597,039 
1990 376,950 1,247,156 788,506 
1991 413,319 1,360,363 883,918 
1992 699,605 1,489,745 1,076,900 
1993 582,021 1,469,156 1,370,272 
1994 839,334 1,571,501 1,597,227 
1995 1,001,443 1,613,848 1,864,379 
1996 1,097,230 1,751,484 2,111,045 
1997 1,246,735 1,830,960 2,278,846 
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Figure 2.6. Map oflndonesia 






















































Source: Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA 
















Table 2.17. Number of Large Estates by Type of Crop in Indonesia, 1991-1995 
Year 
Crops 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Perennial Crops 
Rubber 490 490 485 480 480 
Coconut 251 251 240 335 335 
Oil Palm 289 289 330 352 352 
Coffee 174 174 171 164 167 
Cocoa 280 280 274 273 275 
Tea 126 124 125 127 127 
Clove 152 152 130 114 100 
Kapok 30 30 27 26 25 
Cinchona 8 8 7 7 7 
Annual Crops 
Sugar Cane 73 70 69 70 72 
Tobacco 23 23 23 22 22 
Rosella 12 12 13 13 12 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, 1997 
Table 2.18. Exports oflndonesian Palm Oil (PO) and Palm Kernel Oil (PKO) 1995-
1999 
Palm Oil Palm Kernel Oil 
Month, Year Volume Value Volume Value 
(Metric Tons) {FOB US $ 000) {Metric Tons) {FOB US $ 000) 
1995 
Jan, 73,779.9 43,947.8 16,697.4 9,584.6 
Feb, 73,708.4 46,857.1 21,371.8 14,667.6 
Mar, 107,138.1 67,549.1 19,391.5 9,574.9 
Apr, 81,018.5 51,223.9 33,389.8 20,215.5 
May, 95,090.8 59,164.8 28,005.5 16,956.6 
Jun, 88,369.6 51,291.1 32,510.3 17,654.0 
Jul, 90,717.7 52,309.6 16,898.3 8,370.8 
Aug, 65,014.4 36,810.5 21,229.2 14,018.4 
Sep, 131,724.1 76,457.9 20,283.8 13,080.8 
Oct, 167,682.2 96,169.4 36,156.1 24,710.0 
Nov, 136,467.9 78,902.8 40,807.6 24,847.7 
Dec, 154,312.6 86,729.8 24,657.6 13,586.4 
TOTAL 1,265,024.2 747,413.8 311,398.9 187,267.3 
1996 
Jan, 822,264.9 44,273.9 15,235.1 9,707.9 
Feb, 160,791.4 81,211.0 20,599.9 13,502.2 
Mar, 158,701.8 80,539.2 27,147.3 17,483.4 
Apr, 99,433.6 50,682.4 26,240.0 18,221.0 
May, 139,040.3 68,775.2 34,007.0 23,543.8 
Jun, 98,752.8 48,215.1 26,132.8 18,956.8 
Jul, 141,041.1 71,611.4 26,698.7 18,574.3 
Aug, 211,660.7 100,970.3 27,003.8 18,124.2 
Sep, 154,806.4 68,925.4 47,730.7 33,347.8 
Oct, 142,314.6 68,502.9 28,759.0 20,088.1 
Nov, 154,945.0 75,191.3 31,328.1 22,132.7 
Dec, 128,203.8 66,516.8 30,440.5 21,485.8 
TOTAL 1,671,956.4 825,414.9 341,322.9 235,168.0 
1997 
Jan, 76,290.0 37,524.7 23,974.3 14,166.1 
Feb, 177,298.2 94,457.8 48,558.8 32,861.9 
Mar, 106,176.3 55,382.2 19,115.0 13,653.4 
Apr, 186,595.0 98,308.4 33,772.0 22,458.5 
May, 148,304.6 77,298.4 38,448.6 25,697.5 
Jun, 224,223.5 110,363.7 41,420.0 27,599.7 
Jul, 345,938.4 173,214.5 40,613.1 27,092.6 
Aug, 331,852.1 160,648.1 53,755.0 27,159.2 
Sep, 378,792.0 179,481.6 45,226.7 21,567.7 
Oct, 314,718.5 142,753.3 43,834.3 20,675.6 
Nov, 471,600.5 219,142.7 64,795.3 30,279.3 
Dec, 205,810.1 97,524.7 49,465.4 31,043.8 
TOTAL 2,967,599.2 1446,100.l 502,978.5 294,255.3 
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Table 2.18. Continued 
Palm Oil Palm Kernel Oil 
Month, Year Volume Value Volume Value 
(Metric Tons) {FOB US $ 000} (Metric Tons) (FOB US $ 000) 
1998 
Jan, 13,011.2 5,092.6 16,990.0 10,141.3 
Feb, 25,056.5 11,238.9 34,583.5 19,391.0 
Mar, 104,088.0 49,143.2 90,819.2 51,207.9 
Apr, 38,845.4 17,873.6 32,183.0 17,711.0 
May, 138,071.7 78,563.5 33,592.7 14,349.0 
Jun, 91,951.1 45,563.2 23,389.0 13,669.6 
Jul, 184,030.9 97,848.1 33,047.6 18,419.8 
Aug, 123,713.6 53,432.8 6,789.5 4,177.9 
Sep, 110,690.7 51,026.1 12,599.8 7,877.9 
Oct, 143,883.2 75,963.8 4,240.0 2,519.9 
Nov, 321,364.2 158,204.7 42,305.0 25,307.4 
Dec, 184,571.7 101,327.3 16,469.0 10,574.2 
TOTAL 1,479,278.2 745,277.8 347,008.3 195,346.9 
1999 
Jan, 84,456.4 42,950.1 12,664.0 7,192.0 
Feb, 197,436.9 101,668.5 47,344.0 29,200.7 
Mar, 217,044.9 97,244.4 42,675.4 25,763.8 
Apr, 158,417.9 69,778.1 30,452.9 16,947.2 
May, 190,305.3 79,066.0 77,402.1 44,902.1 
Jun, 165,340.5 55,147.2 65,211.0 36,517.5 
Jul, 332,410.6 106,148.2 54,485.5 31,388.4 
Aug, 529,463.9 146,087.3 48,423.7 25,809.5 
Sep, 532,869.4 151,322.0 72,067.7 40,887.2 
Oct, 370,302.0 103,166.6 44,599.3 25,129.3 
Nov, 246,154.2 71,220.6 47,632.6 28,264.4 
Dec, 274,784.3 90,443.6 54,884.2 35,972.5 
TOTAL 3,298,986.3 1,114,242.6 597,842.4 347,974.6 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, Database 
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Figure 2. 7. Indonesia's Export Prices of Palm Oil (PO) and Palm Kernel Oil 
(PKO), 1995-1999 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, Database 
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2.7. Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil Industry of Malaysia 
Malaysia began palm oil and palm kernel oil production in early 1917. In the 
1950s the Malaysian government promoted an immense policy of agricultural 
diversification that included diversification from rubber and coffee plantations to palm oil 
plantations (Mahmud, 1982). 
In Malaysia, palm oil trees are located in the Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and 
Sarawak (Figure 2.8. and Table 2.19.). Malaysian planted area of palm oil trees 
increased from290,967 hectares in 1970 to 3,313,393 hectares in 1999 (Table 2.19.). In 
1999, 58.6 percent of palm oil area was operated and managed by private estate 
companies; 25.6 percent by government organizations such as Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation 
Authority (FELCRA), and Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority 
(RISDA); 8.7 percent by smallholders; and 7.1 percent by state schemes (Table 2.20.). 
FELD A (Federal Land Development Authority) is a government agency with the 
authority to open untouched land and forestry to be used for smallholder projects, 
FELDA was created in 1962. FELCRA is the Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority, with the duty to rehabilitate and expand the basic land, unused 
land, and the land developed earlier in a low cost state scheme. RISDA, the Rubber 
Industry Smallholders Development Authority, has a duty to replant rubber areas to be 
palm oil plantation (Moll, 1987). 
Malaysian crude palm oil (CPO), palm kernel (PK), crude palm kernel oil 
(CPKO), and palm kernel cake (PKC) productions increased since 1979 (Figure 2.9.). In 
1999, 10,553,918 metric tons of crude palm oil (CPO) was produced; 3,025,690 metric 
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Source: The World Factbook 2000 
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Table 2.19. Malaysia's Palm Oil Planted Area (Hectares), 1970-1999 
Year P. M'sia Sabah Sarawak Total 
...... Hectares ...... 
1970 260,903 28,947 1,117 290,967 
1980 906,590 93,967 22,749 1,023,306 
1990 1,698,498 276,171 54,795 2,029,464 
1991 1,744,615 289,054 60,359 2,094,028 
1992 1,775,633 344,885 77,142 2,197,660 
1993 1,831,776 387,122 87,027 2,305,925 
1994 1,857,626 452,485 101,888 2,411,999 
1995 1,903,171 518,133 118,783 2,540,087 
1996 1,925,483 556,260 133,526 2,615,269 
1997 1,956,573 715,736 147,007 2,819,316 
1998 1,987,190 842,496 248,430 3,078,116 
1999 2,051,595 941,322 320,476 3,313,393 
Note: P.M'sia = Peninsular Malaysia 
Source: Arabis, 2000 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.20. Distribution of Palm Oil Planted Area in Malaysia 1997-1999 
Category 1997 1998 1999 
Hectares % Hectares % Hectares % 
Private Estates 1,498,481 53.15 1,751,371 56.90 1,942,452 58.62 
Government 
Schemes 681,482 24.17 672,142 21.84 674,948 20.37 
FELD A 117,735 4.18 130,651 4.24 132,354 4.00 
FELCRA 37,063 1.32 37,862 1.23 41,561 1.25 
RISDA 
State Schemes 224,515 7.96 221,729 7.20 235,565 7.11 
Smallholders 260,040 9.22 264,361 8.59 286,513 8.65 
TOTAL 2,819,316 100.00 3,078,116 100.00 3,313,393 100.00 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1998 
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Figure 2.9. Annual Production of Crude Palm Oil (CPO), Palm 
Kernel (PK), Crude Palm Kernel Oil (CPKO), and 
Palm Kernel Cake (PKC) in Malaysia, 1979-1999 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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tons were palm kernel (PK); 1,338,905 metric tons were crude palm kernel oil (CPKO); 
and 1,624,134 metric tons of palm kernel cake (PKC) were produced. Palm oil [ crude 
palm oil (CPO) plus processed palm oil (PPO)] was the major export product followed by 
palm kernel cake (PKC) and palm kernel oil (PKO) [ crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) plus 
processed palm kernel oil (PPKO)] (Figure 2.10.). Palm oil (PO) exports, especially 
processed palm oil (PPO), increased while crude palm oil (CPO) exports declined (Figure 
2.11). Since 1991, palm kernel oil (PKO) exports has decreased (Figure 2.12.) while 
volume of exports of processed palm kernel oil (PPKO) was bigger than crude palm 
kernel oil (CPKO). 
In 1999, Malaysia exported 261,123 metric tons of crude palm oil (CPO); 
8,651,385 metric tons was processed palm oil (PPO); 84,170 metric tons was crude palm 
kernel oil (CPKO); 465,722 metric tons was processed palm kernel oil (PPKO); and 
1,245,493 metric tons was palm kernel cake (PKC). Malaysian palm oil (PO), palm 
kernel oil (PKO), and palm kernel cake (PKC) products are exported, which palm oil 
(PO) is dominant. 
The export value of Malaysian palm oil (PO) and palm kernel oil (PKO) prodQcts 
increased from US$ 10,973.80 in 1995 to US$ 16,142.90 in 1999 (Table 2.21.). 
Processed palm oil (PPO) made the biggest contribution to foreign exchange earning 
from palm oil industry in Malaysia. West Asian Countries such as India and Pakistan 
were the major importers of Malaysian palm oil (PO) while European countries such as 
Netherlands and the USA were the most important importers of Malaysian palm kernel 
oil (PKO), while the Netherlands and Germany were the biggest market for Malaysian 
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Figure 2.10. Annual Exports of Palm Oil (PO), Palm Kernel Oil 
(PKO), and Palm Kernel Cake (PKC) Products in 
Malaysia, 1976-1999 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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Figure 2J I. Annual Export of Palm Oil (PO) Including Crude 
Palm Oil (CPO) and Processed Palm Oil (PPO) in 
Malaysia, 1976-1999 . 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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Figure 2.12. Annual Export of Palm Kernel Oil (PKO) Including 
Crude Palm Kernel Oil (CPKO) and Processed Palm 
Kernel Oil (PPKO) in Malaysia, 1983-1999 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table 2.21. Export Value of Malaysian Palm Oil Products, 1995-1999 
Product 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
...... RM Million ...... 
Palm Oil 10,073.7 9,232.1 10,581.0 17,650.7 14,418.1 
(PO) 
Palm Kernel 710.7 862.5 759.6 1,269.8 1,494.1 
Oil(PKO) 
Palm Kernel 189.4 255.1 207.2 218.2 230.7 
Cake (PKC) 
TOTAL 10,973.8 10,349.7 . 11,547.8 19,138.7 16,142.9 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1995 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1996 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1997 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Annual average prices of palm oil and palm kernel oil products in Malaysia are 
informed in Table 2.22. In 1995-1999, crude palm oil (CPO) local prices were between 
RM 1,191.50 to RM 2,377.50 per metric ton; palm kernel (PK) prices were RM 323.00 to 
RM 1,115.50 per metric ton; and crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) had range price between 
RM 578.00 to RM 2,525.50 per metric ton. 
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Table 2.22. Annual Average Prices of Palm Oil Products in Malaysia, 1980-1999 
Year Crude Palm Oil (CPO) Palm Kernel (PK) Crude Palm Kernel Oil (CPKO) 
(LocalDelivered) (Ex-Mill) (Local Delivered) 
...... US Dollar I Metric Ton ...... 
1981 429.72 238.04 502.38 
1982 357.56 183.96 383.87 
1983 423.74 289.90 610.81 
1984 580.10 378.35 869.02 
1985 433.19 221.26 478.35 
1986 222.37 124.16 222.18 
1987 310.25 185.63 364.64 
1988 379.35 228.94 446.27 
1989 304.56 203.78 401.45 
1990 259.64 146.22 282.80 
1991 307.14 187.63 357.81 
1992 351.62 252.25 508.15 
1993 329.51 171.23 354.87 
1994 501.80 280.12 599.34 
1995 579.61 290.10 623.11 
1996 471.34 319.04 667.15 
1997 349.25 194.56 442.61 
1998 625.66 293.55 664.61 
1999 381.45 281.45 641.84 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 
3.1. Chronology of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia 
Before 1997, the Indonesian economy had a real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate of over 7 percent per year. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 
over US$ 1,000.00, inflation was 5 percent, and the current account deficit from its 
gross domestic product (GDP) was about 4 percent (Garran, 1998; Country 
Commercial Guides). 
During and after the crisis of 1997-1998, the Indonesian government 
approximated that its real GDP shrank by 19 percent, while economic growth was 5 
percent in 1997 and-13 percent in 1998 (Appendix Table A-6), inflation was 5.25 
percent in 1997 and 56.25 percent in 1998 (Appendix Tables A-7 and A-8). Gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita dropped drastically to US$ 450.00, and the 
exchange rate moved from Rp 2,383.00 per US dollar in December 1996 to Rp 
7,100.00 per US dollar in December 1999 (Appendix Table A-9). The crisis caused 
higher unemployment. Unemployment rose from 4,197,306 people in 1997 to 
5,062,783 people in 1998 (Appendix Table A-10). 
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The chronology of the crisis of 1997-1998 in Indonesia is stated below: 
July 7, 1997 
August 14, 1997 
January 1997 through July 1997, Indonesian exchange rate in 
Rupiah per US dollar gradually increased from 2,396.00 to 
2,599.00. Indonesia's foreign debt was US$ 109.3 billion in 
March 1997. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 2,599.00 per US dollar. 
Although the Rupiah started on a speculative confrontation after 
Thai's Baht had been floated, it began to deteriorate. Thailand 
went to a floating exchange rate scheme on July 2, 1997. The 
Indonesian government responded to the Thailand crisis by 
widening its exchange rate intervention band from 8 percent to 12 
percent (Jackson, 1999; Saxena). Intervention band is the range 
points of upper and lower intervention which the country's bank 
central should intervene its market exchange rate. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 3,035.00 per US dollar. The 
Bank Indonesia ( central bank oflndonesia) stated that it 
abandoned its intervention band allowing Rupiah to float freely 
against US dollar. Thus the Rupiah value was no longer restrained 
by the government (Jackson, 1999). Bank Indonesia had 
abolished its managed exchange rate system. A high interest rate 
(70 % ) was set by Bank Indonesia. The Rupiah instantaneously 
depreciated by 6 percent after the announcement of the 70 % 
interest rate policy change. 
70 
September 16, 1997: The average exchange rate was Rp 3,275.00 per US dollar. The 
Indonesian government made an effort to reduce budget 
Octo her 1, 1997 
October 8, 1997 
October 22, 1997 
outlays by announcing that some US $ 13 billion in infrastructure 
projects would be either called off, delayed, or reconsidered 
(Jackson, 1999). A Rp. 38.92 trillion project would be postponed, 
and other Rp. 62.6 trillion project would be reviewed. The other 
major projects that were postponed were 14 power generators, 2 
oil refineries, and 29 toll roads. In addition, nine power plants 
and 19 toll roads were being reviewed. Major projects that were 
canceled included bridges between Java and Madura island, Java 
and Sumatra island, and Sumatra and Malaysia. 
The average exchange rate was Rupiah 3,670.00 per US dollar. 
Again to handle the crisis, the Indonesian government tried harder 
to delay the projects. Hence, additional seventy five projects 
(their worth was US $ 62 billion) were postponed. The Indonesian 
government asked for help from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Jackson, 1999). The help from International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was needed to strengthen the Indonesian financial 
sector. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced support and 
help for Indonesia after the Indonesian government requested aid. 
US $ 40 billion would be given to Indonesia by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), some of Indonesia's neighbors, the 
October 31, 1997 
November 5, 1997 
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World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. 
The Indonesian government signed its first Letter oflntent to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The letter called for a three-
year economic recovery program supported by loans from the 
International Monetary Fund) (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and bilateral donors (Country Commercial 
Guides). 
The average exchange rate was Rp 3,648.00 per US dollar. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed a US $ 10 billion as 
a component of an international package. As a result US $ 3 
billion was released for disbursement with a note that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) would require the Indonesian 
government to: 1) adopt fiscal measures to maintain a surplus; 2) 
tighten the monetary policy; 3) close down the unviable banks; 4) 
liberalize foreign trade and investment; 5) dismantle domestic 
monopolies, break up the government monopolies, and reduce the 
interest of ruling families and its cronies (Saxena); 6) allow 
private sector participation in infrastructure; and 7) increase the 
transparency of public sector activities to enhance the quality of 
governance. Following the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
packages, 16 banks were shut down by the Indonesian 
government (Woo, Sachs, and Schwab, 2000). Other banks 
experienced rush and panic. 
November 8, 1997 
December 8, 1997 
The projects that were cancelled, postponed, and reviewed on 
September 16, 1997 were reinstalled. 
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The average exchange rate was Rp 4,650.00 per US dollar. It was 
announced that President Soeharto had health problems which led 
to the cancellation of two overseas meetings including a meeting 
of the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. Four directors from the 
· central bank oflndonesia were dismissed. Monetary instability in 
Indonesia increased. Four state banks (Bank Dagang Negara, 
Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Ekspor Import Indonesia, and Bapindo) 
were merged by the government in order to cope with the crisis. 
December 24, 1997: The Indonesian debt was rated as "Bal" Gunk rating) by Moody's 
January 4, 1998 
January 6, 1998 
Investor Service. As a result, international banks were very 
reluctant to give business loans in Indonesia. 
The minimum wage was deliberated to be increased by the 
government. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 10,375.00 per US dollar. The 
Indonesian government publicized Rp. 133.5 trillion as the 1998-
1999 state budget. The businessman and investors in Indonesia 
refused the budget after the announcement, they disputed that 
1998-1999 budget was unrealistic and over optimistic. The 
budget was based on an assumed exchange rate of Rp 4,000 per 
US dollar; a real growth rate of 4 percent; inflation rate of 
January 15, 1998 
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9 percent; and oil price ofUS $ 17 per barrel. The Rupiah 
dropped further from Rp 7,000 to Rp 10,000 per US dollar. 
People hurried to traditional markets, stores, and supermarkets to 
buy and stock food in the expectation of higher prices and 
vanishing commodities. The Rupiah got ''junk 
bond status" grade from rating agency Standard & Poor. Again, 
the Indonesian government applied that the projects on the 
statement on September 16, 1997 to be reviewed, postponed, and 
canceled. 
Indonesia's agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
was revised for the first time. Accordingly, President Soeharto 
signed a new reform package called Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies. The memorandum specified: 
1) Financial sector restructuring. Including closing unviable 
institutions, merging state banks, and establishing a 
timetable for dealing with remaining weak institutions; 
2) Structural reforms to enhance economic efficiency and 
transparency. Which included liberalization of foreign 
trade and investment. Dismantling of domestic 
monopolies such as sugar, wheat, and cloves. They also 
wanted to expand the privatization program. Eliminating 
the cement, paper, and plywood cartels. Abolishing all 
services that government gives to the national car project, 
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and airplane project Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional 
(IPTN). The national car project was given to PT Timor 
Putra Nasional (PT TPN) company that was operated by 
Mr. Hutomo Mandala Putra (he is son of Mr. Soeharto the 
president oflndonesia). For the project, PT Timor Putra 
Nasional imported cars in completely built up from KIA 
Motor Corp. South Korea without tax of luxury selling 
and import tax. PT Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional 
(PT IPTN) was established in 1976 with helped from Mr. 
B.J. Habibie as the president director. PT Industri 
Pesawat Terbang Nasional (PT IPTN) was the industry 
that needed huge input capital, at least US $ 650 million 
from Indonesia budget was given without giving back the 
income from its business; 
3) Stabilizing the Rupiah via the retention of a tight 
monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate policy; 
4) · Implementing fiscal policy to about one percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1997/98, and two percent in 
1998/99 to yield a public sector surplus of one percent of 
GDP in both periods and to facilitate external adjustment 
and provide resources to pay for financial restructuring. 
The fiscal policies included cutting low priority 
expenditures, including postponing or rescheduling major 
January 19, 1998 
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state enterprise infrastructure projects, removing 
government subsidies, adjusting administered prices 
including the prices of electricity and petroleum products. 
To attempt with the memorandum, the Indonesian government: 
a) reduced the 1998/99 budget; 
b) cancelled of 12 infrastructure projects and the revoking of 
discontinuation of privileges for the PT Industri Pesawat 
Terbang Nusantara's airplane projects (PT IPTN) 
and the National Car project; 
c) further restructuring in the bank and corporate sectors. The 
establishment of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) to manage reorganization process. Provided a 
government guarantee on bank deposits and credits; 
d) limited the monopoly of the national marketing board 
(BULOG) to rice. Deregulated domestic trade in agriculture 
produce. Eliminated restrictive market of good; 
e) took policy to alleviate the suffering caused by drought before 
1997. Ensured that adequate food supplies are available at 
reasonable prices (IMF); 
f) dismantled the monopoly on cloves, and fuel (Garran, 1998). 
The Rupiah was 12,000 against US dollar. There was news that 
corporations should pay dollar debts in Rupiah. Consequently, 
the Indonesian government announced that fuel subsidies would 
January 21, 1998 
January 22, 1998 
January 24, 1998 
be cut. 
President Soeharto verified that he would attempt to be the next 
president. 
The exchange rate was Rp. 17,000 per US dollar. The Rupiah 
continued to weaken due to: 
1) the apparent lack of a solution to Indonesia's huge private 
sector short term dollar denominated debts; 
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2) questions about Indonesia's commitment to the reform package 
by International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
3) the International Money Fund (IMF) aid package seemed could 
not solve Indonesian crisis since the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) had given the aided US $ 10 billion two months 
ago; 
4} and the succession issue that Indonesia's research and 
technology minister Mr. B.J. Habibie being preferred as a 
candidate for the vice president (IMF). The foreign balance 
due by private and government business now can be paid by 
using Rupiah. 
The Indonesian government corrected the 1998-1999 state budget, 
fromRp. 133.5 trillion to 147.2 trillion using International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) assumptions of: 
1) zero economic growth for upcoming fiscal year; 
2) an annual inflation rate of 20 percent; 
January 27, 1998 
February 6, 1998 
February 14, 1998 
February 17, 1998 
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3) an exchange rate was Rp. 5,000 per US dollar (IMF). 
The Indonesian government announced new reforms in banking 
that would guarantee commercial bank obligations, and allow 
overseas investment in local banks. The debt servicing that was 
given by the Indonesia government for private business was 
momentarily stopped. 
The Currency Board System (CBS) was planned to be applied by 
the Indonesia government, which would peg the Rupiah to US 
dollar. 
There was a riot in West Java province because of a hike in the 
price of commodities such as rice and palm oil. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 8,750.00 per US dollar. Mr. 
B. J. Habibie was confirmed as vice president oflndonesia. The 
Governor of the Bank Indonesia was fired by president Soeharto 
since he was opposing the Currency Board System (CBS) that 
was to be approved by the government. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank gave statements that 
they refused to apply the Currency Board System (CBS) in 
Indonesia since Indonesian banks had the banking problems and 
Indonesia did not have enough backup of gross foreign assets and 
government incomes. With the banking problems and not enough 
government income, the implementation of the Currency Board 
System (CBS) could cause: 
February 22, 1998 
March 1, 1998 
1) monetary policy does not work since the Currency Board 
System (CBS) does not allow it; 
2) to increase the interest rate and capital out from the country 
when government income backup is not enough. 
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The Indonesian government and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) would reach a deal of US $ 23 billion aid package with the 
economic reform in exchange. As a result, 54 ineffective banks 
( 4 state owned banks, 11 regional development banks, and 39 
private banks) were turned over to the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) for restructuring/closure 
(Goldstein, 1998). 
The Indonesian government eliminated the polemical the 
Currency Board System (CBS) since it can make situation worse. 
The general assembly for the president oflndonesia 1998-2003 
has begun from March 1, 1998 to March 11, 1998. In Indonesia, 
the people do not vote directly for their president but from 500 
parliamentarians (Indonesia's highest legislative body) that they 
chose through the election then the parliamentarians choose the 
president. The Indonesia's highest legislative body not only 
chooses the president but the vice president too. There were two 
parties (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan or the United Development 
Party, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or the Indonesian 
Democracy Party) and one :functional group (Golongan Karya or 
March 14, 1998 
April 10, 1998 
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GOLKAR) that were running for parliamentarian seats. The 
average exchange rate was Rupiah 8,325.00 per US dollar. The 
Indonesian government attempted to implement the Currency 
Board System (CBS), which was an unconfirmed in the 
agreement by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Later, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development 
Bank, and the World Bank postponed the second US $ 3 billion 
aid to Indonesia when the Indonesian government was ready to 
use the Currency Board System (CBS). The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) found that the Indonesian government did 
not put into action the points of economic reform from the Letter 
oflntent that was endorsed in January 1998. President Soeharto 
started his 4th decade as the president, and Mr. B.J. Habibie as the 
vice president. The seventh development cabinet was sworn in by 
president Soeharto .. Finally, t!ie Indonesian government 
announced that they would not put the Currency Board System 
(CBS) into operation. 
The IMF and world leaders announced that they were dissatisfied 
that president Soeharto chose his eldest daughter (Mrs. Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana) and his golfing partner (Mr. Bob Hasan) as 
part of his new 36 member cabinet. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 7,970.00 per US dollar. 
Indonesia's agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was revised for the second time. The International 
Monetary Fund requested that the Indonesian government: 
1) eliminates the paper cartel; 
2) eliminates the plywood cartel; 
3) eliminates the clove monopoly; 
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4) reforms its wood sector by introduction of a resource rent tax 
on forestry products, ,and reduction of export taxes on logs and 
timber, including dismantlement of joint marketing boards of 
wood products, and reforms of forestry concession ownership 
rules; 
5) embarks upon a program to privatize state enterprises; 
6) eliminates many distortions in the agricultural and food 
marketing sectors including a dramatic downsizing of the 
National Logistic Agency (BULOG); 
7) prepares procedures for bank mergers; 
8) enacts a government regulation in lieu of amendment of 
bankruptcy law; 
9) establishes a special commercial court; 
10) addresses the private-debt settlement issues; 
11) establishes social safety net; 
12) does gradual phase out of subsidies for essential commodities; 
13) submits a draft law on competition policy. 
' 
May 4, 1998 
May 9, 1998 
May 12, 1998 
As feedback to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform 
package, the Indonesian government released the first 
supplementary memorandum called the Supplementary 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. Some 
statements of the first supplement were: 
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1) a strong monetary policy to ensure stabilization of the Rupiah; 
2) accelerated bank restructuring and the elimination of existing 
foreign ownership restrictions on bank, and the issuance of a 
new bankruptcy.law; 
3) a comprehensive agenda of structural reforms to increase 
competition and efficiency in the economy; further 
privatization of six major state enterprise and the identification 
of seven new enterprise for privatization in 1998/99; 
4) strengthening the social safety net through the support for 
small and medium sized enterprises and through public works 
program oflnternational Monetary Fund. Seven banks were 
closed by the government. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 10,525.00 per US dollar. The 
Indonesian government increased fuel prices up by 71 percent 
followed by demonstration and riot in Jakarta. 
President Soeharto left for Egypt to attend G-15 meeting. 
The Indonesian army shot six students ofUniversitas Trisakti 
May 14, 1998 
May 15, 1998 
May 16, 1998 
May 18, 1998 
May 20, 1998 
82 
near their campus Universitas Trisakti, Grogol, Jakarta. Other 16 
students were injured. It happened when the students of 
Universitas Trisakti had long march to the building of people's 
consultative assembly Jakarta demanded political and economic 
reforms. Shops and supermarkets in some areas in Indonesia 
were robbed and burned by people (Garran, 1998) targeting the 
Chinese business in Indonesia. President Soeharto was requested 
by the Indonesian Muslim leaders and the oppositions to step 
down. 
Riot dispersed in capital city, Jakarta, with an estimated 1,180 
deaths and numerous others injured. 
President Soeharto returned from Egypt earlier than expected. 
Foreign companies and embassies evacuated staff and family out 
oflndonesia. 
President Soeharto proposed a reshuffling of his cabinet members 
to solve the current situation. 
Mr. Harmoko, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
called on president Soeharto to step down. People called to 
eliminate collusion, corruption, and nepotism. 
The Indonesian parliament building in Jakarta was occupied by 
thousands of students demanding that president Soeharto 
resigned. Fourteen ministers of president Soeharto's cabinet 
announced their resignation. 
May 21, 1998 
May 22, 1998 
May 29, 1998 
June 2, 1998 
June 24, 1998 
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President Soeharto announced his resignation as president of the 
Republic oflndonesia (Garran, 1998). The resignation of 
president Soeharto came after the worst situation when 
demonstrating students were shot, also the country was engulfed 
in riots and looting which led to an increase in fuel prices. 
President Soeharto was replaced by the vice 
president B.J. Habibie. With this change, political and economic 
reforms were being applied by the Indonesian government. 
President B.J. Habibie swore in his cabinet members. 
The Indonesian government announced the next election in 1999. 
Former president Soeharto was investigated by the Indonesian 
government with regard to his wealth. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 14,900 per US dollar. 
The Indonesia's agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was revised for the third time. The Indonesian government 
again delivered the Second Supplementary Memorandum of 
Economic and Financial Policies. Its most important points were: 
1) increasing social expenditure to a level equivalent to 7.5 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
2) rehabilitating and strengthening the distribution system 
following the disruption caused by social disturbances; 
3) restructuring the banking system, moving swiftly to 
recapitulate, merge, and close the weak banks. 
July 29, 1998 
August, 1998 
The average exchange rate was Rp 13,000.00 per US dollar. 
Indonesia's agreement with the IMF was revised for the fourth 
time. The Indonesian government issued a Letter oflntent and 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. The letter: 
1) described the progress in restructuring the banking system; 
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2) officially launched the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency 
(INDRA); and 
3) discussed the distribution system and the social safety net. The 
Rupiah reached 15,000.00 against a US dollar when there was 
chaos of regional instability in Irian Jaya and East Timor. 
The average exchange rate was Rp 11,075.00 per US dollar. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed the disbursement of 
US $ 460 million. The World Bank delivered a warning that the 
World Bank would stop a loan if the Indonesian government did 
not solve the Bank Bali scandal appropriately, as this scandal had 
depleted investor's confidence. The bank Bali scandal 
spotlighted on the Rupiah 546 billion (US $ 78 million) to PT Era 
Giat Prima (PT EGP) that is managed by a former deputy 
treasurer of president B.J. Habibie's ruling Golongan Karya 
(GOLK.AR) party. Rupiah 546 billion (US $ 78 million) was a 
fee for letting the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
to pay bank Bali Rupiah 904 billion (US $ 146 million) owed by a 
bank that was taken by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
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Agency (IBRA). The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) stated that the repayment of interbank claims on closed-
down banks did not need the services of any third party as the 
claims were insured by the agency. 
September 11, 1998: The average exchange rate was Rp 10,700.00 per US dollar. 
Another Letter oflntent and Supplementary Memorandum of 
Economic and Financial Policies was issued. The main points of 
the letter were: 
1) measures to improve the food situation in terms of both 
availability and price were being implemented. The program 
for providing subsidized rice to at least 7.5 million poor 
families was extended. BULOG's monopoly on a number of 
food commodities was eliminated; 
2) framework designed to promote voluntary restructuring of 
corporate debt was established; 
3) and the efficiency and transparency of the newly established 
special commercial court was enhanced. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) threatened to stop 
financial aid to Indonesia if it did not control the violence in East 
Timor. East Timor had become a place of bloodshed and terror, 
in an attempt to gain independence from Indonesia. Further more, 
the United Nations peacekeeping forces were going to East Timor 
to control the situation in East Timor. The International 
October 19, 1998 
October 29, 1998 
Monetary Fund (IMF) further stated that it was upset with the 
approach Indonesian government took to solve the Bank Bali 
scandal. As a result, a US $ 120 million loan would be 
discontinued by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) if 
Indonesian government does not resolve Bank Bali scandal in 
October 1998. 
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The average exchange rate was Rp 7,550.00 per US dollar. 
Another Letter oflntent and Supplementary Memorandum of 
Economic and Financial Policies was issued. The letter described 
further banking reforms. 
The Indonesian government started a bank recapitalization 
scheme. 
November 13, 1998: The average exchange rate was Rp 7,300.00 per US dollar. 
Another Letter oflntent and Supplementary Memorandum of 
Economic and Financial Policies were issued by the Indonesian 
government. The letter described further enhancement of the 
social safety net. The Indonesian government announced 
liquidation of 16 private sector banks. The announcement caused 
panic in depositors, which initiated the liquidity crisis that 
developed into banking crisis. The liquidity crisis that happened 
was the banks lacked sufficient cash to expand the inventory 
which caused banking crisis such as a case that bank does not 
have enough public funding. 
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December 16, 1998: The average exchange rate was Rp 8,025.00 per US dollar. 
US $ 1 billion was disbursed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
3.2. Chronology of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis in Malaysia 
Bilateral and multilateral programs such as International Monetary Fund aid 
package Indonesia adopted were not implemented by the Malaysian government to 
handle the crisis. Instead the Malaysian government applied the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) approaches such as: a) reducing the current account deficit; b) keeping fiscal 
regulation; and c) maintaining a steady banking system. 
Before the crisis, Malaysia had a good economic performance. Malaysian 
average real Gross Domestic Products (GDP) growth was 8.0 percent per year in the 
decade before 1997, unemployment rate averaged 2. 7 percent, and the average inflation 
rate of2.8 percent per year. 
However, the Asian financial crisis caused economic and political problems in 
Malaysia too. In the 1997 and 1998, the average Malaysian economic growth real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was 7.5 percent and '-6.5 percent respectively (Appendix Table 
A-11). The inflation rate was 2.50 percent in 1997 and 5.50 percent in 1998 (Appendix 
Table A-12), and the Malaysian Ringgit depreciated from RM 2.4868 per US dollar to be 
RM 4.2200 per US dollar from 1997 to 1998 (Appendix Table A-13.). A real political 
problem arose when the Malaysian government dismissed Mr. Anwar Ibrahim as the 
deputy prime minister and finance minister. The chronology of the crisis and the 




July 2, 1997 
July 8, 1997 
July 14, 1997 
July 24, 1997 
88 
The Malaysian Ringgit (RM) per US dollar increased from 2.4868 
to 2.5110. The Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia 
or BNM) announced that bank lending for property and purchase 
of stock were limited. The Central Bank of Malaysia called this a 
reform package, where loans to property were decreased from 40 
percent to 20 percent. 
The average exchange rate was RM 2.5140 per US dollar 
The average exchange rate was RM 2.5235 per US dollar. 
Ringgit, the Malaysian currency had lost confidence from 
investors. 
The average exchange rate was RM 2.6360 per US dollar. An 
amount RM 10 billion was pumped by the Central Bank of 
Malaysia, which was the foreign reserve to support Malaysian 
Ringgit in speculation that the country might have a crisis 
(Kaplan and Ke). 
The Central Bank of Malaysia intruded to protect the Malaysian 
Ringgit by inducting US $.4 billion, and it also increased the 
domestic interest rate. 
The Central Bank of Malaysia was left with no option to allow the 
Malaysian Ringgit to float without restraint. 
The Malaysian Ringgit was melted down, with more depreciation. 
The Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad blamed 
mischievous speculators as the cause for the depreciation of 
July 26, 1997 
August 20, 1997 
August 23, 1997 
August 28, 1997 
August 29, 1997 
September 4, 1997 
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Malaysian Ringgit (The United Kingdom Executive Council for 
Malaysian Students). 
Mr. George Soros (the international hedge fund and speculator 
manager) was alleged as the culprit for the depreciation of the 
Malaysian Ringgit by the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
(The United Kingdom Executive Council for Malaysian 
Students). 
The average exchange rate was RM 2.9620 per US dollar. 
Standard & Poor's downgraded Malaysia's sovereign rating from 
"positive" to ''stable" (Wong). 
Again, the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad 
blamed Mr. George Soros for leading the attack not only on 
Malaysian Ringgit but also on other East Asian currencies (The 
United Kingdom Executive Council for Malaysian Students). 
Rents in the capital have already started to fall. In trying to 
support the real estate prices, the Malaysian government 
eliminated a levy on foreigners' purchases of property (Wong). 
The short selling of shares was effectively banned by the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.1975 per US dollar. To 
handle the crisis, the Malaysian government tried to reduce 
government spending. As a result, a number of multi-million 
dollar construction projects were held up by Prime Minister Dr. 
September 5, 1997 
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Mahathir Mohamad (The United Kingdom Executive Council for 
Malaysian Students). Again, RM 60 billion endowment was set 
by the Malaysian government to prop up the national stock 
market that was already on a downward plunge and to put up a 
defense against alleged racist foreign speculators (Wong). 
The ban on short selling of shares was reversed by Prime Minister 
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, and he announced that again the 
Malaysian government should delay several large projects 
including the Bakun Dam project (Kaplan and Ke). 
September 22, 1997: At the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
October 1, 1997 
and the World Bank in Hong Kong, the Malaysian Prime Minister 
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was still blaming Mr.George Soros for 
the financial crisis in Malaysia and its consequences. Meanwhile, 
the Deputy Prime Minister and finance minister, Mr. Anwar 
Ibrahim tried to consolidate the Malaysian financial problem by 
using economic management which included putting off several 
large infrastructure projects of Malaysia, reducing Malaysia's 
current account deficit, and cutting the Malaysian government 
public spending by 2 percent. 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.4370 per US dollar. The 
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad called for 
tighter regulation or a total ban on foreign exchange trading, and 
he suggested that currencies should be linked to the economic 
October 7, 1997 
October 17, 1997 
November, 1997 
December 4, 1997 
December 5, 1997 
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indices of the country concerned (The United Kingdom Executive 
Council for Malaysian Students). 
There was a rumor that Dr. Mahathir Mohamad would resign, but 
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad announced that the rumor was wrong. He 
criticized foreigners for allegedly trying to oust him by sowing 
discord between him and his deputy minister Mr. Anwar Ibrahim 
(Kaplan and Ke). 
Again the Malaysian government announced a belt-tightening 
budget to try to stop the economy sliding into recession (The 
United Kingdom Executive Council for Malaysian Students). 
In the budget, the Malaysian government projected to have 7 
percent growth, a 1.9 percent increase in government spending, 
and a cut in corporate taxes from 30 percent to be 28 percent in 
anticipation of the crisis (Kaplan and Ke). 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.5010 per US dollar. 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.8883 per US dollar. In 
evaluating all economic matters in the crisis, Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad announced the establishment of the National 
Economic Action Council (NEAC). Mr. Daim Zainuddin, the 
former Malaysian finance minister is the chairman of the council. 
A project of an expensive land bridge is being built (The United 
Kingdom Executive Council for Malaysian Students). 
Once more, in an effort to re-establish the confidence in the 
December 8, 1997 
Malaysian economy, the Malaysian finance minister announced 
cutbacks on several large projects (The United Kingdom 
Executive Council for Malaysian Students), and intentions to 
tighten credit were announced. He proposed to cut Malaysian 
government spending by 18 percent, and to cut the expensive 
import goods (Garran, 1998). 
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Once more, Mr. Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister and 
. finance minister pledged to slash government spending, curb big-
ticket imports, and restrict bank credits and stock market fund 
raising (The United Kingdom Executive Council for Malaysian 
Students). 
December 22, 1997: Moody's Investor Service downgraded the Malaysian sovereign 
January 3, 1998 
January 20, 1998 
February 6, 1998 
debt to junk bond status (The United Kingdom Executive Council 
for Malaysian Students). 
The average exchange rate was RM 4.5450 per US dollar. In an 
attempt to restore confidence in the Malaysian banking system, 
the Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) 
proposed merging finance companies and commercial banks 
(Wong). 
Starting today, depositors were given safety guarantee of their 
money from Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.6750 per US dollar. The 
Malaysian government stated that the 39 finance companies in 
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Malaysia must merge into 6 groups (Wong). 
February 7, 1998 The Bank Negara Malaysia announced that it is reducing the 
statutory reserve requirements (SSR) of banking institutions 
(Kaplan and Ke). 
' 
March 25, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 3.6430 per·us dollar. A 
Program to consolidate finance companies and to recapitulate 
commercial banks is announced by the Malaysian government. 
April, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 3.7365 per US dollar. There 
was a conflict between the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad and the Deputy Minister Mr. Anwar Ibrahim about the 
interest rate policy that the Malaysian government should apply 
(Haggard, 2000). 
May, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 3.8785 per US dollar. 
June 20, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 4.1750 per US dollar. 
Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd (Danaharta), an asset 
management company was established under the ministry of 
finance {Haggard, 2000). The former :finance minister Mr. Daim 
Zainuddin, a long time confidant of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was 
appointed as a special minister to the cabinet. 
July 7, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 4.1425 per US dollar. The 
Malaysian government asked Japan to lend more than US$ 713 
million in support of its public work program in its economic 
crisis (Wong). 
August 10, 1998 
August 29, 1998 
September 1, 1998 
September 2, 1998 
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The average exchange rate was RM 4.2200 per US dollar. 
Danamodal Nasional Bhd (Danamodal) was established as a bank 
restructuring and recapitalization with the assistance of two 
foreign investment banks, Salomon Smith Barney and Goldman 
Sachs (Haggard, 2000). There was a major conflict in the 
Malaysian government, between Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad and Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Anwar Ibrahim. The 
deputy prime minister proposed to follow the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions, such as a) tight money; b) 
prudent fiscal policy; c) open up the economy to foreign capital 
without actually asking for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) aid. 
The governor and deputy governor of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(Malaysian central bank) resigned over policy differences with 
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. 
The average exchange rate was RM 3.8000 per US dollar. The 
Malaysian government announced capital controls, proposed that 
the exchange rate would be pegged. Also, it released the 
disclosure requirements, and adopted measures to stimulate bank 
lending. 
The Malaysian government announced that Mr. Anwar Ibrahim 
was sacked as a deputy prime minister and fmance minister 
(Mckee). This announcement was followed by protests and 
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demonstrations by the supporters of Mr. Anwar Ibrahim. 
September 20, 1998: Mr. Anwar Ibrahim (former deputy prime minister and finance 
minister) was arrested under the Malaysian Internal Security Act. 
October 1, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 3.8000 per US dollar. The 
government implemented exchange controls, fixing the Ringgit 
exchange rate at RM 3.80 to the US dollar (Kaplan and Ke). 
November, 1998 The average exchange rate was RM 3.8000 per US dollar. 
December 12, 1998: The average exchange rate was RM 3.8000 per US dollar. 
Foreigners are offered incentives such as increased loan financing 
and discounts to boost the local property market. 
The 1997-1998 Asian financial crises caused Indonesian and Malaysian currency 
depreciated :from Rp 2,207.00 to Rp 14,900.00 for Indonesia and from RM 2.4832 to RM 
4.5450 for Malaysia against US dollar, and affected the banking troubles. Alongside the 
economic problems, the Asian financial crisis created the political problems in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. The political problems impacted the change of president in Indonesia and 
forced the step down of deputy prime minister and finance minister in Malaysia. In 
coping with the crisis, Indonesia and Malaysia governments reduced their budget 
spending by canceling some its government projects. Indonesia got help :from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) aids while Malaysia did not. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFFECTING 
THE PALM OIL AND PALM KERNEL OIL INDUSTRY 
4.1. Indonesian Government Policies 
Because of the importance of palm oil for food security, the Indonesian 
government has used several policy interventions including: 1) export tariffs; 2) 
government purchases and sales through BULOG intervention (BULOG is the National 
Logistic Agency); and 3) activities of a quasi government company PT Perkebunan 
Nusantara in the domestic market (Larson, 1996). 
The export tariff rates have been :from 2 to 60 percent. Tariffs were implemented 
to decrease and stabilize the wholesale and the retail prices in the domestic cooking oil 
market. Export tariffs could help domestic consumers afford cooking oil. Conversely, for 
producers, the export tariffs increase the cost of exporting and cause greater emphasis on 
the domestic market. 
BULOG intervention in Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil market began in 
1995. The objective ofBULOG intervention was to reduce and stabilize prices of 
domestic cooking oil. BULOG implemented buffer stocks to accomplish its objectives. 
To stabilize domestic cooking oil prices BULOG increased the quantity of buffer stocks. 
BULOG imported palm oil and palm kernel oil products when domestic production was 
not adequate. BULOG had the power to manage, allocate, and market the palm oil and 
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palm kernel oil products of smallholders, government estate companies, and the private 
companies. Like BULOG, PT Perkebunan Nusantara a government estate company 
production is utilized primarily to stabilize the domestic price of cooking oil. PT 
Perkebunan Nusantara supplied more than 60 to 70 percent of domestic crude palm oil 
(CPO). To market and sell its product for the domestic market as well as exports, PT 
Perkebunan Nusantara employs a state agency trading company the Joint Marketing 
Office (JMO). In addition to selling and marketing PT Perkebunan Nusantara's palm oil 
and palm kernel oil products, the Joint Marketing Office (JMO) helps smallholders 
market their palm oil and palm kernel oil products. 
Generally, there are three markets for crude palm oil (CPO) in Indonesia. First, 
all crude palm oil (CPO) from government estate plantations (such as PT Perkebunan 
Nusantara) and smallholders must be sold through Joint Marketing Office (JMO) for 
domestic and export market. Second, crude palm oil (CPO) from foreign-owned private 
estates that is allocated to the domestic market must use the Joint Marketing Office 
(JMO). Third, crude palm oil (CPO) from private estate plantations owned by Indonesian 
citizens is not subject to domestic allocation and is not required to be marketed through 
the Joint Marketing Office (JMO). 
In the beginning of 1997 the food, agriculture, and industry in Indonesia were 
weakened by the economic crisis and financial dilemmas. Major issues of the crisis were 
financing trade, food shortages, contraction of agricultural imports, and increasing food 
and commodity prices. 
During the crisis 1997 to 1998, food commodity prices increased 56 percent. 
Cooking oil prices rose by 107 percent. Increasing cooking oil and rice prices caused 
98 
panic, social demonstrations and riots. People stocked cooking oil in anticipation of a 
price increase. The cooking oil stocking phenomena caused cooking oil to be hard to find 
and its price increased further. To solve the cooking oil crisis, the Indonesian 
government further intervened the Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil industries as 
described below. 
Some policies applied in anticipation of the economic crisis in Indonesia 
particularly for Indonesian domestic cooking oil are described below: 
September, 1994 The Indonesian government applied export tariff for palm oil 
and palm kernel oil products that will be sold overseas. The 
method that is used to compute the palm oil and palm kernel oil 
export tariff is as: 
January, 1997 
ET=EVx Tx(EP-FP) xER 
Where: 
ET = export tariff 
EV = export volume 
T = export tariff rate 
EP = export price or freight on board (FOB) price 
FP = floor price or the maximum export price which was free 
from export tariff. 
ER= exchange rate 
The average cooking oil price in Indonesia was Rp 2,134.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that the 







The average cooking oil price was Rp 2,133.00 per kilogram. 
The average cooking oil price was Rp 2,124.00 per kilogram. 
The Indonesian government resumed giving investment licenses 
for foreign investors with a note that they must open and 
develop new palm oil plantations only in the eastern region of 
Indonesia and must have a partnership with smallholders. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,121.00 per 
kilogram. The Asian financial crisis started in Indonesia. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,103.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced the 
Deregulation Package to decrease the export tariff rates on palm 
oil and palm kernel oil products ranging from 10 to 12 percent 
to 2 to 5 percent. The new tariff rates are 5 percent on crude 
palm oil (CPO); 4 percent on refined bleached deodorized palm 
oil (RBD palm oil); 4 percent on crude olein; and 2 percent on 
refined bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein). A new method 
to calculate the palm oil and palm kernel oil export tariff is also 
released, which is: 
ET =TX TFV X ER 
Where: 
ET = export tax (Rupiah) 





TFV = total freight on board (FOB) value (US dollar) 
ER = exchange rate (Rupiah per US dollar) 
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Compare with the older method, the variable T and ER are the 
same. TFV is the new variable which is formed from the 
method {EV x (EP-FP)}, where EV is export volume, EP is 
export price, and FP is floor price. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,113.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,165.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government asked BULOG to 
increase the quantity of crude palm oil (CPO) domestic 
purchases from PT Perkebunan Nusantara. 
The average domestic cooking oil price rose to Rp 2,387.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,402.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that the 
Indonesian Minister of Agriculture had established export 
restrictions for Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil products 
( quota distribution). The export restriction will be applied in 
December 1997. l'he restriction stated that the crude palm oil 
(CPO) producers were required to restrict their exports of crude 
palm oil (CPO) to 25 percent of their total production, and 
producers were not allowed to export their crude palm oil (CPO) 
December 17, 1997 




until they had already confirmed that they have kept 75 percent 
of their crude palm oil (CPO) for the Indonesian domestic 
markets. The export restrictions were designed to decrease the 
current inflation tension caused by the increasing domestic 
prices of cooking oil. 
The Indonesian government increased export tariff rates palm oil 
and palm kernel oil products from a range of2 to 5 percent to 30 
percent. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 2,578.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government released a Distribution 
Letter stating that from December 24, 1997 to April 1998 all 
Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil product exports are 
banned. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 3,357.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that foreign 
investment on palm oil plantations is now allowed again. This 
statement was released as reconciliation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) under the Letter oflntent. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,288.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that only 
Indonesian palm kernel oil and stearin could be exported. Sixty 
percent of total stearin stock can be exported and 100 percent of 




palm oil and palm kernel oil products such as crude palm oil 
(CPO), refined bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD palm oil), 
crude olein, refined bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein), are 
prohibited. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,204.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,226.00 per 
kilogram. This month, the Indonesian government removed the 
ban on exports for Indonesian crude palm oil (CPO) as a 
feedback to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Letter of 
Intent that was signed in January 1998. The government set the 
new export tariffs of 40 percent on crude palm oil (CPO); 35 
percent on refined bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD palm 
oil); 40 percent on crude olein; 35 percent on refined bleached 
deodorized olein (RBD olein); 35 percent on crude stearin; 30 
percent on refined bleached deodorized stearin (RBD stearin); 
35 percent on crude palm kernel oil (CPKO); 30 percent on 
refined bleached deodorized palm kernel oil (RBD palm kernel 
oil). Starting this month, investment licenses for new palm oil 
plantations by new foreign investors will be temporarily stopped 
and some private refineries were picked by the government to 
process crude palm oil (CPO) from PT Perkebunan Nusantara, 
and its distribution will be handled by BULOG (the National 
May 25, 1998 
June, 1998 
July 14, 1998 
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Logistic Agency). 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,653.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that the 
government halted processing by selected private refineries of 
crude palm oil (CPO) PT Perkebunan Nusantara. Starting today, 
BULOG will not distribute cooking oil of which the crude palm 
oil (CPO) was from PT Perkebunan Nusantara, but BULOG will 
still distribute cooking oil from private plantations. 
The average domestic cooking oil price rose to Rp 5,100.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price rose to Rp 6,288.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government attempted to further 
restrict the increasing domestic retail cooking oil price by 
increasing export tariffs on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products. Export tariffrates on crude palm oil (CPO) increased 
from 40 to 60 percent; from 35 to be 50 percent for crude palm 
kernel oil; 60 percent on crude palm olein; 55 percent on refined 
bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein); 55 percent on refmed 
bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD palm oil); 25 percent on 
crude stearin; 20 percent on refmed bleached deodorized stearin 
(RBD stearin); 45 percent on refmed bleached deodorized palm 
kernel oil (RBD palm kernel oil). The Indonesian government 









of palm oil and palm kernel oil products. BULOG now no 
longer has the authority to buy palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from PT Perkebunan Nusantara and private companies. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 6,302.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 6,336.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 5,806.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 5,525.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 5,635.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,529.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,688.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that the 
government decreased the export tariff rates: 1) crude palm oil 
(CPO) from 60 to 40 percent; 2) refined bleached deodorized 
palm oil (RBD palm oil) from 60 to 40 percent; 3) crude palm 
olein from 65 to 40 percent; 4) refined bleached deodorized 
olein (RBD olein) from 55 to 32 percent; 5) crude palm stearin 







stearin (RBD palm stearin) from 20 to 10 percent; 7) crude palm 
kernel oil (CPKO) from 50 to 30 percent; 8) refined bleached 
deodorized palm kernel oil (RBD palm kernel oil) from 45 to 20 
percent. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,200.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,430.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,447.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,029.00 per 
kilogram. The Indonesian government announced that the 
government yet·again decreased the export tariff rates for palm 
oil and palm kernel oil products: 1) crude palm oil (CPO) export 
tariff rate has been decreased from 40 to 30 percent; 2) refined 
bleached deodorized palm oil (RBD palm oil) from 32 to 22 
percent; 3) crud~ olein from 40 to 26 percent; 4) refined 
bleached deodorized palm olein (RBD palm olein) from 32 to 22 
percent; 5) crude palm stearin from 20 to 15 percent; 6) refined 
bleached deodorized stearin (RBD stearin) from 10 to 7 percent; 
7) crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) from 30 to 20 percent. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 3,605.00 per 







that export tariff rates on crude palm oil (CPO) would be 
decreased from 30 percent to 10 percent as specified in the 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF); from 22 
to 6 percent for refined bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein); 
from 26 to 8 percent for crude olein; from 22 to 6 percent for 
refined bleached deodorized olein (RBD olein); from 15 percent 
to zero for crude palm stearin; from 7 percent to zero for refined 
bleached deodorized stearin (RBD stearin); from 20 percent to 
zero for crude palm kernel oil (CPKO); and from 15 percent to 
zero for refined bleached deodorized palm kernel oil (RBD palm 
kernel oil). 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 6,107.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 5,963.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 6,214.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 4,000.00 per 
kilogram. 
The average domestic cooking oil price was Rp 3,775.00 per 
kilogram. 
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Before the crisis in June 1997, the average price of domestic cooking oil in 
Indonesia was Rp 2,121.00 per kilogram. When the crisis started in June 1997, the price 
of domestic cooking oil was Rp 2,112.00 per kilogram. In October 1997, the domestic 
cooking oil price increased to more than Rp 2,500.00 per kilogram (Figure 4.1. ). The 
Indonesian government tried to decrease the domestic cooking oil price to under 
Rp 3,000 per kilogram by imposing export restrictions (ER) on palm oil and palm kernel 
oil in December 1997. Imposing export restrictions did not reduce and stabilize domestic 
cooking oil prices (Figure 4.1.). Domestic cooking oil prices continued to increase. 
While the export restriction policy was being applied, large quantities of palm oil 
and palm kernel oil products continued to be exported (Figure 4.2.). Incentives to export 
were great because the world price of palm oil products was high and increasing (Figure 
4.3.). 
In the beginning of December 1997, the Indonesian government applied to set 
higher export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil products (IT I), domestic cooking 
oil prices continued to increase and reached more than Rp 4,000.00 per kilogram (Figure 
4.1.). In the last week of December 1997 the Indonesian government changed the export 
tariff rate (IT I) with export ban for all palm oil and palm kernel oil products (B). The 
cooking oil domestic price was still above Rp 4,000.00 per kilogram (Figure 4.1.). By 
February 1998, the domestic cooking oil prices appeared to decrease. The export ban 
policy (B) ended in April 1998. In April 1998 the Indonesian government allowed palm 
oil and palm kernel oil products to be exported subject to an export tariff. This was a 
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Figure 4.1. Average Domestic Prices of Cooking Oil in Indonesia, 
January 1997 to December 1999 










= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 10 to 12 percent to range 2 to 5 percent 
= export restriction on palm oil and palm kernel oil productions 
= increase export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 2 to 5 percent to around 10 percent 
= palm oil and palm kernel oil products are banned for export 
= palm oil products are banned for export, but palm kernel oil 
products are still allowed for export. 
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= now palm oil and palm kernel oil products are allowed to export 
· with export tariff rate in range 30 to 40 percent 
= increase export tariff rate. on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 30 to 40 percent to 45 to 60 percent 
= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
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Figure 4.2. Palm Oil (PO) and Palm Kernel Oil (PKO) Export from 
Indonesia, January 1997 to December 1999. 












= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 10 to 12 percent to range 2 to 5 percent 
= export restriction on palm oil and palm kernel oil productions 
= increase export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 2 to 5 percent to around 10 percent 
= palm oil and palm kernel oil products are banned for export 
= palm oil products are banned for export, but palm kernel oil 
products are still allowed for export. 
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= now palm oil and palm kernel oil products are allowed to export 
with export tariff rate in range 30 to 40 percent 
= increase export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 30 to 40 percent to 45 to 60 percent 
= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 45 to 60 percent to 20 to 55 percent 
= palm oil 
= palm kernel oil 
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Figure 4.3. World Average Prices of Palm Oil and Palm Kernel 0~ 
January 1997 to December 1999 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1998; 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999; 












= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 10 to 12 percent to range 2 to 5 percent 
= export restriction on palm oil and palm kernel oil productions 
= increase export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 2 to 5 percent to around 10 percent 
= palm oil and palm kernel oil products are banned for export 
= palm oil products are banned for export, but palm kernel oil 
products are still allowed for export. 
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= now palm oil and palm kernel oil products are allowed to export 
with export tariff rate in range 30 to 40 percent 
= increase export tariff rate· on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range 30 to 40 percent to 45 to 60 percent 
= decrease export tariff rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products from range.45 to 60 percent to 20 to 55 percent 
= world prices of palm oil 
= world prices of palm kernel oil 
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Indonesia. The palm oil and palm kernel oil products were exported subject to the higher 
export tariff rate (IT II). 
When the Indonesian government implemented IT II, the domestic cooking oil 
price increased more than Rp 6,000.00 per kilogram (Figure 4.1. ). After three months of 
application oflT II, the Indonesian government decided to change the policy by further . 
increasing the export tariff rate. This new policy was the highest export tariff rate (IT Ill) 
that the Indonesian government had set in its domestic palm oil and palm kernel oil 
industry. Under the new export tariff rate, IT III, the domestic cooking oil price 
decreased to under Rp 5,000.00 per kilogram from Rp 7,000.00 per kilogram. 
The Indonesian government applied the highest export tariff rate, IT III for 7 
months. After that, the Indonesian government began to reduce the export tariff rate in 
order to add more foreign exchange income from palm oil and palm kernel oil exports 
and to improve conditions in the domestic palm oil and palm kernel oil industry. The 
Indonesian government reduced the export tariff rate (DT II) from IT III, the domestic 
cooking oil price decreased from under Rp 5,000.00 per kilogram to Rp 4,000.00 per 
kilogram after four months of applying DT II (Figure 4.1.). In the fifth month ofDT II, 
the domestic cooking oil price increased again reaching more than Rp 6,000.00 per 
kilogram (Figure 4.1.). 
4.2. Malaysian Government Policies 
The Asian financial crisis also affected the Malaysian palm oil industry. Malaysia 
did not have a problem with its domestic cooking oil price like Indonesia, which 
Indonesian government had to apply some policies for its palm oil and palm kernel oil 
industry to stabilize its domestic cooking oil prices. 
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During and after the crisis of 1997-1998, the Malaysian government did not 
change and/or apply any new policies in the palm oil and palm kernel oil industry. 
Instead, the policy on palm oil and palm kernel oil export tariff rates were same as before 
and after the crisis. The policy that the Malaysian government applied in palm oil and 
palm kernel oil export tariffs as stated by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia is given 
below which some samples are listed in Appendix Table A-14: 
1. Crude Palm Oil (CPO) 
The export duties ( export tariffs) is based on the gazetted value of crude palm oil 
(CPO). It is only levied at a price level exceeding RM 650.00 per ton, which is 
estimated to be the cost of production. On the first RM 650.00 per ton, the export duty 
is nil; on the next RM 50.00 per ton, the export duty is 10 percent; Plus on the 
next Malaysian Ringgit 50.00 per ton, the export duty is 15 percent; on the next 
Malaysian Ringgit 50.00 per ton, the export duty is 20 percent; on the next 
Malaysian Ringgit 50.00 per ton, the export duty is 25 percent; on the balance, 
the export duty is 30 percent. 
2. Processed Palm Oil (PPO) 
The Export duty is based on the gazetted value of processed palm oil (PPO), whereby 
a duty is calculated in Malaysian Ringgit per ton according to the rates and categories. 
Category I is for processed palm oil (PPO) products which has undergone one stage 
process (such as neutralized/refmed palm oil, bleached palm oil, crude palm olein). 
The export duty category I is 5 percent. Category II is processed palm oil (PPO) 
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products, which has undergone two processing stages ( such as neutralized/refined 
bleached palm oil, neutralized/refined palm oil, bleached palm oil). The export duty 
for category II is 5 percent. Category III and IIIA are processed palm oil (PPO) 
products, which have undergone three processing stages ( such as neutralized/refined 
bleached deodorized palm oil 6 red max, neutralized/refined bleached palm olein, 
neutralized/refined bleached deodorized palm oil 3 red max). The export duty 
for category III and IIIA is zero. Category IV is processed palm oil (PPO) products 
which have undergone the following four processing stages (such as 
neutralized/refined bleached deodorized palm olein). The export duty category IV is 
zero. 
3. Palm Kernel (PK) 
Crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) has a 10 percent export duty. Refined bleached 
deodorized palm kernel oil (RBD palm kernel oil) has 5 percent export. Crude palm 
kernel olein has 5 percent export duty. Refined bleached deodorized palm kernel 
olein has no export duty. Crude/refined bleached deodorized palm kernel stearin has 5 
percent export duty. Hydrogenated/refined bleached deodorized palm kernel olein, 
hydrogenated/refined bleached deodorized palm kernel stearin, and crude palm stearin 
have no export duty. 
When the crisis started in June 1997, the exports of palm oil and palm kernel oil 
products (PO, PKO, and PKC) from Malaysia were not decreased, instead, the export of 
palm oil and palm kernel oil increased to 908,679 metric tons in September 1997 from 
735,742 metric tons in June 1997 (Figure 4.4.). However, from October 1997 the palm 
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Figure 4.4. Palm Oil (PO), Palm Kernel Oil (PKO), and Palm Kernel 
Cake (PKC) Exports from Malaysia, January 1997 to 
December 1999 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000; 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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an increase in palm oil and palm kernel oil export since in May 1998 to 927,227 metric 
tons (October 1998). From November 1998 to February 1999, the Malaysian palm oil 
and palm kernel oil export decreased. In March 1999, palm oil and palm kernel oil 
exports increased to 1,054,087 metric tons. 
Surprisingly the Asian financial crisis did not reduce the Malaysia's revenue from 
palm oil and palm kernel oil exports (Figure 4.5.). During the crisis from June 1997 to 
August 1998, Malaysia's foreign revenue from palm oil and palm kernel oil export had 
an increasing trend. The highest revenue was in August 1998 with a value of2,094.90 
million Malaysian Ringgit. From September 1998 to December 1999, the palm oil and 
palm kernel oil export revenue decreased but its revenue was still above the revenue 
before the crisis. Palm oil contributed to the largest revenue followed by palm kernel oil 
and palm kernel cake. 
However, the crisis had an effect on domestic prices of palm oil and palm kernel 
oil products. During the crisis domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches (FFB), crude palm 
oil (CPO), palm kernel (PK), and crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) increased (Figures 4.6. 
and 4.7.). The increasing prices could have been caused by the weak of Malaysian 
Ringgit against US dollar, and policies of the Indonesian government like export 
restriction, export ban, and higher tariff rates, which triggered the shortage of supply of 
palm oil and palm kernel oil products in the world market. 
In the crisis, Malaysian government did not apply policies on its palm oil and 
palm kernel oil industry, but Indonesian government applied some policies such as: 1) 
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Figure 4.5. Values of Palm Oil (PO) Export, Palm Kernel Oil (PKO) Export, 
and Palm Kernel Cake (PKC) Export from Malaysia, January 
1997 to December 1999 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000; 
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Figure 4.6. Average Domestic Prices of Crude Palm Oil (CPO), Palm 
Kernel (PK), and Palm Kernel Oil (PKO) in Malaysia, 
January 1997 to December 1999 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Figure 4.7. Average Domestic Prices of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) in 
Malaysia, January 1997 to December 1999 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000; 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999; 
Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1998 
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THEORY AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK 
This chapter .states the theory and previous empirical work used for this study. 
The theory and its hypotheses are in section 5.1. and 5.2. Previous empirical work is in 
section 5 .3. The theory section is parted into three subsections, in subsection 5. I. I. 
International Trade, subsection 5.1.2. Taxes on Exports (Export Tariffs), and subsection 
5.1.3. Depreciation of the Exporter Country's Currency. For each subsection a three 
panel diagram will be used. The theory section will lead to the empirical models. 
Summaries of previous research on exports, taxes and optimal export policies, and 
exchange rate are presented. 
5.1. Theory 
5. I. I. International Trade 
International trade among countries happens when countries have differences 
in their comparative advantage and they want to obtain economies of scale in 
production (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1988). By using excess supply and excess demand, 
McCalla and Josling (1985) state the theory of international trade. McCalla and Josling 
(1985) describe the international trade theory with national supply and demand functions 
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Figure 5 .1. International Trade Three Panel Diagrams 














P = price of good i 
Q = quantity of good i 
Pw = the equilibrium world price of good i 
PA = the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country A 
PB = the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country B 
Qw = the equilibrium world quantity of good i 
QA = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country A 
QB = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country B 
QA1 = quantity demanded of good i in country A when the world price 
of good i is Pw 
QA2 = quantity supplied of good i in country A when the world price 
of good i is Pw 
= excess supply curve of good i 
= excess demand curve of good i 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country A 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country A 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country B 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country B 
= quantity demanded of good i in country B when the world price 
of good i is Pw 
= quantity supplied of good i in country B when the world price of 
good i is Pw 
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country A and country B that produce good i. Assume: 1) single homogeneous 
commodity; 2) two-country world; 3) no government intervention; 4) and country A is a 
lower priced producer of good i and the country B is a higher priced producer of good i. 
When there is no trade for good i between these two countries, the domestic equilibrium 
price and quantity for country A are PA and QA, and for country B, Pa and Qa. For 
country A, when the price of good i is above PA then producers of good i in country A 
produce more good i than domestic consumers in country A would buy, there is excess 
supply of good i in country A. In country B, when the price of good i is below Pa then 
the domestic consumer B would buy more good i than producer country B can produce, 
there is excess demand of good i in country B. 
Suppose there is trade in good i between country A and B, with the assumption 
that transportation cost is zero. In the international market excess demand for good i 
equals excess supply for good i. The resulting equilibrium world price of good i is Pw 
and the equilibrium quantity traded of good i is Qw. For country A, Pw is higher than PA. 
Country A gains by exporting its product good i to the international market ( world 
market). For country B, Pw is less than Pa, and consumers in country B demand more of 
good i. Country B imports good i from the international market (world market). Country 
A will export good i (QA2 - QA1) and country B will import good i (Qa2 - Qa1) where 
(QA2 - QA1) = Qw = (Qa2 - Qm). 
5.1.2. Taxes on Exports (Export Tariffs) 
Taxes on export (export tariffs) are an export restriction levied on goods 
leaving the country (Patterson, 1989). Taxes on exports (export tariffs) result 
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in lower domestic prices and higher foreign prices. Production, consumption, and 
volume of exports also change (Weinblatt, 1985). Weinblatt (1985) stated that countries 
impose export restrictions such as taxes on exports ( export tariffs) to ensure the 
continuity of domestic supply and to stabilize prices in domestic markets. Taxes on 
exports ( export tariffs) cause a supply shock in exporter country, shift the export supply 
curve to the left and trigger the world price to increase and decrease the quantity traded 
(Figure 5.2). 
Using the same assumptions and conditions in Figure 5.1., when exporter 
country (country A) applies export taxes (export tariffs) on good i, the SA excess supply 
curve of good i country A shifts to the left to SA1 by the amount of the export tariff. 
World ES (Excess Supply) curve shifts to the left to ES 1 curve. With the export taxes 
(export tariffs) in country A, excess supply shifts to the left to the ESl curve and the 
world equilibrium price of good i increases from Pw (world equilibrium price before the 
export taxes in country A) to Pw1 (world equilibrium price when the export taxes ( export 
tariffs) applied in country A) and the world equilibrium quantity of good i decreases from 
Qwto Qw1. 
Along with world price Pw1, the export country ( country A) produces QA3 of good 
i which QA4 is demanded by domestic country A. Export taxes ( export tariffs) causes the 
export of good i ( export good i) from country A to decrease from (QA2 - QA1) to 
(QA3-QA4). 
Ulbrich (1983) stated that numerous countries tax exports in order to deter the 
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= price of good i 
= quantity of good i 
= the equilibrium world price of good i before export taxes 
applied in country A 
= the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country A before export 
taxes applied in country A 
= the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country B 
= the world equilibrium quantity of good i before export 
taxes applied in country A 
Qw1 = the world equilibrium quantity of good i with export 
taxes applied in country A 
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QA = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country A before export 
taxes applied in country A 
Q8 = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country B 
QA1 = quantity demanded of good i in country A when the world 
QA2 
QA3 
price of good i is Pw, before export taxes applied in country A 
= quantity supplied of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw, before export taxes applied in country A 
= quantity supplied of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw1, when export taxes applied in country A 
= quantity demanded of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw1, when export taxes applied in country A 
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ES = excess supply curve of good i, before export taxes applied in country A 
ES 1 = excess supply curve of good i, when export taxes applied in country A 
ED = excess demand curve of good i 
SA = domestic supply curve of good i in country A, before export taxes 
applied in country A 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country A, when export taxes 
applied in country A 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country A 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country B 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country B 
= quantity demanded of good i in country B when the world price 
of good i is Pw, before export taxes applied in country A 
= quantity supplied of good i in country B when the world price of 
good i is Pw, before taxes export applied 
= quantity demanded of good i in country B when the world price 
of good i is Pw1, when export taxes applied in country A 
= quantity supplied of good i in country B when the world price of 
good i is Pw1, when taxes export applied 
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exports for two basic reasons: 1) to keep the domestic price of a good low; and 2) to 
exploit power in a world market (international market) by using export taxes to raise the 
price foreign buyers pay for their exports which also generates domestic government 
income. 
5.1.3. A Depreciation of the Exporter Country's Currency 
When there is exchange rate instability in the markets the domestic and world 
markets will be influenced. Figure 5.3. explains the condition of markets for good i when 
there is depreciated currency of exporter country of good i. The assumptions are: 1) 
single-commodity market; 2) one country exporter and one country importer; 3) and good 
i trade in the world market is denominated in US dollar. Before the currency depreciation 
in exporter country A, the equilibriums world market of good i are Qw for quantity and 
Pw for price which country A exports good i as (QA1 - QA2). Currency depreciation in 
country A causes producers of good i in country A to become willing to supply more of 
good i to gain more profit in its domestic currency. Country A sells good i in the world 
market in obtaining US dollars. The exporter with depreciated currency ( country A) 
indicates that in the world market good i from country A is more competitive and less 
expensive than before. SA curve in country A shifts to the tight to SA1, the excess supply 
curve ES ( excess supply of good i) in the world market shifts to ES 1. The equilibrium 
quantity increases from Qw to Qw1, and price decreases from Pw to Pw1. At Pw1 country 
A exports (QA3 - QA4). 
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Figure 5.3. International Trade Three Panel Diagrams with Depreciating Currency 
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= quantity of good i 
= the equilibrium world price of good i before depreciation currency in 
exporter country A 
= the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country A before 
depreciation currency in exporter country A 
= the equilibrium domestic price of good i in country B 
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Qw = the world equilibrium quantity of good i before depreciation currency in 
exporter country A 
Qw1 = the world equilibrium quantity of good i when there is depreciation 
currency in exporter country A 
QA = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country A before 
depreciation currency in exporter country A 
Qa = the equilibrium domestic quantity of good i in country B 
QA1 = quantity supplied of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw, before depreciation currency in exporter 
country A 
QA2 = quantity demanded of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw, before depreciation currency in exporter 
country A 
QA3 = quantity supplied of good i in country A when the world 




= quantity demanded of good i in country A when the world 
price of good i is Pw1, when there is depreciation currency in exporter 
country A 
= excess supply curve of good i, before depreciation currency in exporter 
country A 
ES 1 = excess supply curve of good i, when there is depreciation currency in 
exporter country A 
= excess demand curve of good i 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country A, before depreciation 
currency in exporter country A 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country A, when there is 
depreciation currency in exporter country A 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country A 
= domestic supply curve of good i in country B 
= domestic demand curve of good i in country B 
= quantity supplied of good i in country B when the world price 
of good i is Pw 
= quantity demanded of good i in country B when the world price of 
good i is Pw 
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5.2. The Theory's Hypotheses 
The theory's hypotheses could be stated as follows: 1) producers in an exporting 
country will increase their production for exports as the world price of their products 
increases; 2) consumers of importer country would increase their import demand when 
the world price of import products are lower than their domestic prices; 3) excess demand 
would equal excess supply good in the world market; 4) an export tariff would be 
expected to increase world price, decrease the quantity traded in the international market, 
and decrease the domestic price; 5) currency depreciation of exporter country would 
increase exports of the product to the world market and would decrease the world price. 
5.3. Previous Empirical Work 
Numerous previous studies have examined international trade, the impact of 
currency fluctuations, and export tariffs. 
5.3.1. Hudson and Ethridge (1999) 
Hudson and Ethridge analyzed the effect of Pakistan's export tax on cotton and 
yarn areas. Pakistan applied an export tax on raw cotton from 1988 - 1995 in order to 
reduce the domestic price of cotton to the advantage.of the domestic yarn industry. For 
cotton Hudson and Ethridge use a model: d(Pc x Ye)= d1t(l + sr) + wdLc + zdT, where d 
is derivative, Pc is the real price of cotton, Ye is the production of cotton fiber, 1t is the 
real industry profit, s is some proportion, r represents the price of capital per unit time, w 
is the real wage, Le is the amount of labor used to produce cotton, z is the real cost of 
land, and T is the amount of land planted to cotton. 
136 
Hudson and Ethridge used another model for yarn. The model was: 
D(P y x Y y) = dn (1 + sr) + wd.Ly + CdP c + P cdC, where d is derivative, Py is the real price 
of cotton yarn, Yy is the production of cotton yarn, n is the real industry profit, sis some 
proportion, r represents the price of capital per unit of time, w is the real wage rate, Ly is 
the amount of labor used to produce cotton yarn, C is the amount of cotton used in the 
production of cotton yarn, and Pc is the real price of cotton. 
Hudson and Ethridge found that: a) the export tax had a significant adverse effect 
on the cotton sector. The export taxation decreased growth in the cotton sector while it 
had little or no impact on the yarn sector; b) the export tax which may carry high social 
cost does not necessarily induce a growth in the processing sector; c) no own-price 
impact for cotton suggested that the cotton consumers did not respond to the cotton price; 
d) the export tax caused a decline in the cotton and yarn industries, it decelerated growth 
in the raw fiber sector; and e) the export tax on raw cotton had no beneficial effects on 
real total output in the yarn sector. 
5.2.2. Repetto (1972) 
Repetto studied optimal export taxes in the short and long run, and its application 
to Pakistan's jute export policy. Repetto used a simple formal analysis in showing the 
relevant parameters and their interaction to derive the formula for the optimum tax. The 
model that was applied: 
T* = (1 I ei) [(r + b) I b] = (1 I ei) [1 + r I b] = (r + b) I es= (r + b) r, where T* is the 
optimal tax can be estimated, ei is the long run demand elasticity, r is the discount factor 
to be interpreted as the social rate of time discount, b is a value between zero and one, r 
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is the tax that would be levied if only the short term demand elasticity were taken into 
consideration and all lagged demand response were ignored or treated as exogenous 
technological trend. Repetto found: a) the optimal tax depends on the long-run and short-
run elasticities, the relationship between them, and on the social time discount rate, b) the 
optimum tax is higher, the higher the discount rate, the slower the demand response, and 
the lower the long run elasticity. 
5.2.3. Yang and Hwang (1994) 
Yang and Hwang studied the pricing behavior in Korean manufacturing. Two 
questions were studied: a) whether price behavior in the two markets (world market and 
domestic market) are definitely in the pass-through of exchange rate into export and 
domestic prices; and b) whether detected dissimilarity in the price behavior can be 
explained by the price discrimination hypothesis. Price equation models were used for 
the study: 
PDit = LjUiijPFit-j + Ljai2jPMi,t-j + Ljai3jCYt-j + aiO + Uit, and 
PXit = LjUnjPFit-j + Ljai2jPMi,t-j + Ljai3jCYt-j + aiO + Uit, where PDit is the change in the log 
of Korean domestic wholesale price for sector i less the unit labor in that sector, PXit is 
the change in the log of the Korean export price (in won) for sector i less the unit labor 
costs in that sector, PFit is the change in the log of the US wholesale price for sector i 
converted into the Korean currency won at the current spot exchange rate less the unit 
labor costs in that sector, PMit the change in the log of the import price of petroleum and 
related products less the unit labor costs in that sector, and CYit is the change in the log of 
Korean cyclical production (measured by the deviation from the log trend of industrial 
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production. 
Six Korean manufacturing industries (textiles; woods and wood products; 
chemicals; nonmetallic minerals and mineral products; metals and metal products; 
machinery and equipments) from 1976 to 1990 were selected for the study. Monthly data 
on export prices, domestic prices, wages, competitor's prices, exchange rates, and 
imported materials prices from December 1976 to December 1990 were used for study. 
Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the models above. In getting the lagged 
effect, the polynomial distributed lag scheme with no endpoint restriction to each 
independent variable was used. 
Yang and Hwang found that Korean manufacturing firms have followed a dual 
pricing strategy. For export prices, Korean manufacturing firms acted as price takers in 
the world market, selling at the competitive world price. Korean exporters absorved 
70 % of a given change in foreign price and/or exchange rate in their margin on export 
sales and passed through the remaining 30 % within three months. Exchange rate 
changes were of little relevance in determining Korean manufacturing firms' relative 
prices in international markets. For domestic prices, changes in foreign prices and/or 
exchange rates did not affect the domestic prices but affected the raw material import 
pnces. 
5.2.4. Feinberg (1986) 
Feinberg studied the effect of exchange rate movements on specific German 
industrial prices. Feinberg used seven years of data (1977 to 1983) for each 41 German 
industries with the model oflog-linear equations: 
i) In RPPiti = ao + a1 In GNPt + a2 In REXCHt 
ii) In RPPiti = ao + a1 In GNPt + a2 ln REXCHt + a3 ln Mti In REXCHt+ 
ai In Hti In REXCHt 
iii) In RPPiti = ao + a1 In GNPt + a5 In SECTEXCHti 
iv) In RPPiti = ao + a1 In GNPt + a5 In SECTEXCHti + 
86 In Mti In SECTEXCHti + a1 In Hti In SECTEXCHti 
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Where RPPiti is relative producer prices for product i year t, GNPt is index ofreal GNP, 
REXCHt is index ofreal external value of the Deutsche Mark against the currencies of 14 
industrialized countries, Mti is value of imports as a percentage of apparent domestic 
consumption, Hti is herfindahl index for industry i year t based on domestic firm 
shipments, SECTEXCHti is industry sector specific movements in the real external value 
of the Deutsche Mark. The results suggest that an increase in the real value of the 
Deutsche Mark lowered the domestic prices of traded German goods. 
5.2.5. Feinberg (1989) 
Feinberg examined the relationship between currency-value fluctuations and 
domestic producer prices. Feinberg assumed: a) allow an oligopolistic structure in 
provision of the domestic good; b) the technology in the domestic good sector is captured 
by a fixed-coefficients linearly-homogeneous production function; and c) the pass 
through from exchange rates to import prices to be less than complete. 
Feinberg used 14 years of data (1974 to 1987) for each of84 US manufacturing 
industries on linear and log equation models: 
i) In RPPiti = 8-0i + ali In GNPt + a2i In REXCHt-1, and 
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ii) In RPPiti = 8oi + ali In GNPt + f (Xi) In REXCHt 
Where RPPI is a relative producer price, GNP is an index ofreal GNP, REXCH is an 
index of real multilateral trade-weighted value of dollar, and f (Xi) is the estimated 
elasticity of domestic prices with respect to the exchange rate. Two-stage procedures 
were: 1) a simple model using industry intercept and slope dummy variables is applied to 
approximate an elasticity of response specific to each industry between the real exchange 
rate and relative producer prices using the pooled cross-section or time series data; and 2) 
a cross-section model is used to explain differences across industries in the estimated 
response elasticity by a series of industry variable. 
Feinburg obtained the results: a) changes in the external value of the US dollar 
passed most fully into domestic prices of industries heavily reliant on imported inputs 
and producing goods highly substitutable for imports; and b) highly capital intensive and 
concentrated industries and those protected by extensive barriers to entry both for 
domestic and foreign sources have exhibited less domestic price change from the 
exchange rate movements. 
5.2.6. Rana and Dowling (1985) 
Rana and Dowling examined whether a small but continuous changes in 
effective exchange rates in nine Asian developing countries (India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) influenced their inflation 
rates. The model used time series data and is written as: 
P = ao + a1 M + a2 Y + a3 pf+ ai WER, where P is the rate of change of domestic prices, 
M is the rate of change of money supply, Y is the rate of change of real GDP, pf is the 
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change of the foreign price of imports, and WER is the rate of change of the import-
weighted effective exchange rate. Granger-Sims type causality tests to investigate the 
assumption of the exogeneity of exchange rate changes to the domestic inflation rate 
were used before estimating the regression. Rana and Dowling found that exchange rate 
changes did not have a significant effect on inflation. 
5.2.7. Kim (1991) 
Kim studied the role of the exchange rate in US external adjustment. Seven 
endogenous variables in the linear and natural logarithm models were used on Vector 
Auto Regression (VAR) with three sets of data (US multilateral trade, US-Japan bilateral 
trade, and US-Germany bilateral). Kim found that the exchange rate is an important 
transmission channel of influence on price, and the exchange rate has strong effects on 
relative prices of traded goods. 
5.2.8. Khan (2001) 
Khan investigated the practice of agricultural taxation in developing countries in 
the perspective of the ongoing policy argument regarding the tax structure and 
administration influencing agricultural products. Khan also studied the conceptual and 
practical problems related with distinctive tax rules. Khan found that governments in 
most countries have trimmed down the export taxes on agricultural producers. Many 
governments have taxes to guard the domestic consumers and producers ( stabilize prices 
for consumers and producers). Negative effects of the taxes include: a) reducing output 
and income of exports; and b) distorting resource distribution. Products such as tea, 
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coffee, cocoa, sugar, rice, soybean, palm oil, coconut oil, rubber, cotton, tobacco, fruits, 
and livestock have been target of export taxes. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The sources of data and empirical methods used for this research are described in 
this chapter. The impacts of the Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian, and Malaysian 
palm oil and palm kernel oil prices are estimated. In section 6.1. the data and study 
period are described. Section 6.2. shows effect of policies on Indonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil prices. Effect oflndonesian policies on Malaysian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil prices are explained in section 6.3. Section 6.4. describes the results. 
6.1. Data and Study Period 
Monthly data from January 1997 through December 1999 are used to estimate the 
parameters of the models. The data for Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil models 
are from Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau Statistic) Jakarta, Indonesia. The data for 
Malaysian palm oil and palm kernel oil are from Palm Oil Registration and Licensing 
Authority (PORLA), and from Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). Both PORLA and 
MPOB are agencies under Ministry of Primary Industries of the Malaysian government. 
6.2. Effects of Policies on Indonesian Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil Prices 
The model for Indonesia has three equations which the left hand side variables 
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( endogenous variables) are export prices of Indonesian palm oil at current time t 
(FOBPO,), export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil at current time t (FOBPKO,), and 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices at current time t (DCOP,), Figure 6.1. Both 
(FOBPO,) and (FOBPKO,) include the tariff on exports. As previously noted, the 
Indonesian government used a variety of trade policy interventions in attempts to control 
cooking oil prices. Under pressure from the IMF, many of the policies were removed 
during the crisis period. The goal of the model is to determine the effect of the policies 
on palm oil, palm kernel oil, and cooking oil prices. 
The models are expected to follow a partial adjustment process. Prices are not 
expected to adjust in one month because many of the prices for sales in the current month 
are negotiated one month in advance. In addition, learning the consequences of new 
information takes time and can involve delays. 
The natural log of export prices oflndonesian palm oil is hypothesized to be 
related to the one period lagged world prices, quantity of exports, and the export ban 
policy. The model is a partial adjustment model. The independent variable in the model 
determines the fully desired, or adjusted, value of the dependent variable (FOBPO,*). 
That is 
1) ln FOBPO,* = ao + a1 ln WPP0,_1 + a2 ln EPO, + a3 B, + e, 
and only a portion v of the total desired adjustment is made in one period: 
2) (ln FOBPO, - ln FOBP0,-1) = v (ln FOBPO, * - ln FOBP0,-1) 
where O < v< 1, and FOBPO, is export price oflndonesian palm oil (US dollar per 
metric ton) at current time t, WPP0,-1 is one period lagged of world prices of palm oil 
(US dollar per metric ton), FOBPOt-I is one period lagged export prices oflndonesian 
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palm oil (US dollar per metric ton), EPO, is quantity exported oflndonesian palm oil 
(000 metric tons) at current time t, B,is dummy variable for export ban policy of 
Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil at current time t ( one for January 1998, February 
1998, March 1998, and April 1998; zero otherwise), and tis time. Solving the second 
equation for ln FOBPO,*, substituting into equation 1, and simplifying yields an equation 
that can be estimated as: 
ln FOBPO, = ao v + a1 v ln WPP0,.1 + (1-v) ln FOBP0,.1 + a2 v ln EPO, + a3 v B, + 
e,. The coefficients that are estimated are the short run parameters (a1 v, a2 v, and a3 v) 
and the long run parameters ( ao, ai, a2, and a3) are calculated by dividing by v. 
Export prices oflndonesian palm oil (FOBPO,) are hypothesized to be positively 
related to the one period lagged world prices of palm oil (WPP0,.1). That is, Indonesian 
prices are expected to follow world prices. Quantity exported in a given month is 
generally a function of commitments and negotiations made in prior months. Prices are 
hypothesized to be positively related to quantity of exports. As stated previously the 
export ban was not totally effective and exports continued. It is hypothesized that export 
prices oflndonesian palm oil in time t will be positively related to the dummy variable 
B, (Indonesian government policy to ban of exporting Indonesian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil in time t). 
Similarly, the natural log of export price of Indonesian palm kernel oil is 
hypothesized to be related to one period lagged world prices, quantity exports, and the 
export ban. The equation is also assumed to follow a partial adjustment pattern. That is: 
3) ln FOBPKO,* =Po+ /31 ln WPPK0,.1 + /32 ln EPKO, + /31 B, + &t 
4) (ln FOBPK01-ln FOBPK0,.1) = v(ln FOBPKO/- ln FOBPK01.1) 
where O < v < 1, solving yields an equation that can be estimated as: 
lnFOBPKOt= /Jov + /31 vln WPPKOt-1 + (l-v)lnFOBPKOt-1 + /32 v lnEPKOt+ 
148 
fJ3 v Bt + St, where FOBPK01 is export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil (US dollar 
per metric ton), WPPK0,_1 is one period lagged world prices of palm kernel oil (US 
dollar per metric ton), FOBPKOt-J is one period lagged export prices oflndonesian palm 
kernel oil (US dollar per metric ton), EPKOt is quantity export oflndonesian palm kernel 
oil (000 metric tons), B1 is dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil 
and palm kernel oil (one for January 1998, February 1998, March 1998, and April 1998; 
zero otherwise), and t is time. 
It is hypothesized that export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil at current time t 
(FOBPK01) are positively related to world prices of palm kernel oil lagged one period 
(WPPK01_1). It is hypothesized that export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil follow 
world prices. Export prices of palm kernel oil are hypothesized to be positively related to 
quantity oflndonesian palm kernel oil exported (EPK01). Export prices oflndonesian 
palm kernel oil in time t are predicted to be positively related to dummy variable B1 
(Indonesian government policy to ban of exporting Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel 
oil in time t). Again, the ban was not fully effective and those exports that did occur were 
expected to be at higher price. 
The last equation, natural log Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices are 
hypothesized to be related to palm oil and palm kernel oil export prices, the existence of 
BULOG intervention, and export tariff rates and is also hypothesized to follow a partial 
adjustment process. The model is: 
5) ln DCOP/ = <po + </Ji ln FOBP01 + </J2 ln FOBPK01 + <p3 BULt + <p4 ETR1 + St 
149 
* 6) (ln DCOPt - In DCOPt-1) = v (ln DCOPt - In DCOPt-1) 
where O < v < 1. Solving yields an equation that can be estimated as: 
In DCOPt = Bo v + B1 vln FOBPOt + (1-v)ln DCOPt-1 + B2 v In FOBPKOt + 
(}3 v BULt + (}4 v ETRt + &t, where DCOPt is Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices (US 
dollar per metric tons) at current time t, DCOP1-1 is one period lagged Indonesian 
domestic cooking oil prices (US dollar per metric tons), FOBP01 is export prices of 
Indonesian palm oil (US dollar per metric ton) at current time t, FOBPK01 is export 
prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil (US dollar per metric ton) at current time t, BUL1 is 
dummy variable for BULOG (National Logistic Agency) activities in Indonesia (one for 
January 1997, February 1997, March 1997, ... , May 1998, June 1998; zero otherwise), 
ETRt is export tariff rates of Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (percent) at current 
time t, and t is time. 
Since vis hypothesized to be less than one, the coefficient for lagged price is 
expected to be between zero and one. Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices (DCOP1) 
are hypothesized to be positively related to export prices oflndonesian palm oil 
(FOBP01) and export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil (FOBPK01). Domestic 
cooking oil is a blend of both palm oil and palm kernel oil. The presence of BULOG 
(National Logistic Agency) activities in Indonesian palm oil, Indonesian palm kernel oil, 
and Indonesian domestic cooking oil industries in time t (BUL1) is hypothesized to affect 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices in time t, its effect would be negative relationship 
which means the BULOG would decrease the Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices. 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices are hypothesized to be negatively related to 
export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil. 
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6.3. Effect of Indonesian Policies on Malaysian Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil 
The model for Malaysian oil has six equations which the left hand side variables 
(endogenous variables) are Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches (PFFBi), 
Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil (PCP01), Malaysian domestic prices of palm 
kernel (PPK1), Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm kernel oil (PCPKOi), export 
prices of Malaysian palm oil (FMPOi), and export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil 
(FMPK01), Figure 6.2. The goal of the model is to determine the effect oflndonesian 
policies on Malaysian palm oil and palm kernel oil prices. The Malaysian equations are 
explained below. 
In the first equation, natural log of the Malaysian domestic price of fresh fruit 
bunches (FFB) is hypothesized to be related to natural log of domestic prices the products 
of fresh fruit bunches (FFB). The equation is: 
Zn PFFB, =Yo+ YI Zn PCPO, + n Zn PPK, + 13 Zn PCP KO,+ e,, 
where P FFB, is Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches (Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton), PCP01 is Malaysian domestic price of crude palm oil (Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton), PPK, is the Malaysian domestic price of palm kernel (Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton), PCPK01 is Malaysian domestic price of crude palm kernel oil (Malaysian 
Ringgit per metric ton), and t is time. 
Crude palm oil, palm kernel, and crude palm kernel oil are products from fresh 
fruit bunches thus it is hypothesized that Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches 
in current time t (FFB) (PFFB,) would have positive relationships with Malaysian 
domestic prices of crude palm oil (PCP01), palm kernel (PPK1), and crude palm kernel 
oil (PCP K01) in time t. 
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In the second equation, natural log of the Malaysian domestic price of crude palm 
oil (CPO) is hypothesized to be related to natural log of the export price, exchange rate, 
and Indonesian policies. The equation is: 
In PCPOt = ~ + 011 In FMPOt + a).? In EXCMt + 013 In ETRt + m, Bt + Ct, 
where PCPOt is Malaysian domestic price of crude palm oil (Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton), FMPOt is export price of Malaysian palm oil (Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton), EXCM, is exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit per US dollar, ETRt is export tariff rates 
oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (percent), Bt is dummy variable for export ban 
policy of Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil ( one for January 1998, February 1998, 
March 1998, and April 1998; zero otherwise), and tis time. 
It is hypothesized the domestic price of crude palm oil is positively related to 
export prices of Malaysian palm oil (FMPOt), the exchange rate (EXCMt), export tariff 
rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (ETRt), and dummy variable for export 
ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (Bt). 
Similarly, in the third equation, natural log of Malaysian domestic prices of palm 
kernel is hypothesized to be positively related to natural log of export prices, exchange 
rate, and Indonesian policies. The equation is: 
In PP Kt = po + p1 In FMPKOt + p2 In EXCMt + p3 In ETRt + p4 Bt + Ct, 
where PP Kt is Malaysian domestic price of palm kernel (Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton), FMPKOt is export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil (Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton), EXCM, is exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit per US dollar, ETR, is export tariff rates 
oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (percent), B, is dummy variable for export ban 
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policy of Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil ( one for January 1998, February 1998, 
March 1998, and April 1998; zero otherwise), and tis time. 
It is hypothesized that Malaysian domestic price of palm kernel is positively 
related to the export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil (FMP KO,), exchange rate 
Malaysian Ringgit-US dollar (EXCM,), export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil (ETR,), and a dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm 
oil and palm kernel oil (B,). 
In the fourth equation, natural log of the Malaysian domestic price of crude palm 
kernel oil is hypothesized to be related to natural log of export prices, exchange rate, and 
Indonesian policies. The equation is: 
In PCP KO,= <po+ rp1 In FMPKO, + rp2 In EXCM, + rp3 In ETR, + (f)4 B, + &t, 
where PCP KO, is Malaysian domestic price of crude palm kernel oil (Malaysian Ringgit 
per metric ton), FMPKO, is export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil (Malaysian Ringgit 
per metric ton), EXCM, is exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit per US dollar, ETR, is export 
tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (percent), B, is dummy variable for 
export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil ( one for January 1998, 
February 1998, March 1998, and April 1998; zero otherwise), and tis time. 
It is hypothesized that Malaysian domestic price of crude palm kernel oil is 
positively related to the export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil (FMPKO,), exchange 
rate Malaysian Ringgit-US dollar (EXCM,), export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil (ETR,), and a dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm 
oil and palm kernel oil (B,). 
In the fifth equation, natural log export prices of Malaysian palm oil are 
hypothesized to be related to the natural log of world prices. The equation is: 
in FMPO, = 1/o + 1/1 WPOM, + &t, 
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where FMPO, is export price of Malaysian palm oil (Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton), 
and WPOM, is world price of palm oil (Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton), and tis time. 
It is hypothesized that export price of Malaysian palm oil is positively related to 
the world prices of palm oil (WPOM,). An increase (a decrease) world prices of palm oil 
would increase (decrease) export prices of Malaysian palm oil. 
In the sixth equation, natural log export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil are 
hypothesized to be related to natural log world prices. The equation is: 
in FMPKO, = Ko+ K1 WPKOM, + &t, 
where FMPKO, is export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil (Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton), and WPKOM, is world price of palm kernel oil (Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton), and t is time. 
It is hypothesized that export price of Malaysian palm kernel oil is positively 
related to the world prices of palm kernel oil (WP KOM,). An increase ( a decrease) world 
prices of palm kernel oil would increase (decrease) export prices of Malaysian palm 
kernel oil. 
6.4. Empirical Results 
6.4.1. Indonesian Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil 
The Indonesian model (three equations; Figure 6.1.) has 35 observations with ten 
exogenous variables ( one period lagged world prices of palm oil in US dollar per metric 
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ton; one period lagged world prices of palm kernel oil in US dollar per metric ton; one 
period lagged export prices include to export tariff oflndonesian palm oil in US dollar 
per metric ton; one period lagged export prices include to export tariff of Indonesian palm 
kernel oil in US dollar per metric ton; dummy variable for export ban policy of 
Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil; quantity export oflndonesian palm oil in 000 
metric tons in time t; quantity export oflndonesian palm kernel oil in 000 metric tons in 
time t; dummy variable for BULOG activities in Indonesia; one period lagged Indonesian 
domestic cooking oil prices in US dollar per metric ton, and export tariff rates of 
Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil in percent), and three endogenous variables 
( export prices include to export tariff oflndonesian palm oil in US dollar per metric ton 
in time t; export prices include to export tariff oflndonesian palm kernel oil in US dollar 
per metric ton in time t; and Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices in US dollar per 
metric ton in time t). 
6.4.1.1. The System of Simultaneous Model 
The results for the system are stated in Table 6.1. By choosing significance at 
P = 0.05 level and P = 0.01 level, the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the 
variables in Indonesian simultaneous equation: model are zero is rejected which the Chi-
Square with 13 d.£ P-Value (or Wald test) is 0.000, and R-Square is 0.9700. 
6.4.1.2. Equation 1: Export Prices oflndonesian Palm Oil 
The results are stated in Table 6.2. In the short run and log run, the coefficients of 
one period lagged world prices of palm oil (WPP0,-1) and one period lagged export 
Table 6.1. The Results of System Indonesian Simultaneous Equation Model by Using 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
System R-Square 0.9700 
Test of the Overall Significance 122.68**2 
Chi-Square with 13 d.f, P-Value 0.000**2 
Note: 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
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Table 6.2. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for Export 
Prices of Indonesian Palm Oil Equation 
Variable Name 
INTERCEPT 
ONE PERIOD LAGGED WORLD 
PRICES OF PALM OIL (US Dollar 
per Metric Ton) 
ONE PERIOD LAGGED EXPORT 
PRICES OF INDONESIAN PALM 
OIL (US dollar per MetricTon) 
QUANTITY EXPORT OF 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL (000 
Metric Tons) 
DUMMY VARIABLE FOR EXPORT 
BAN POLICY OF INDONESIAN 




























v(a portion of the total desired adjustment in one period) is 0.5783 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 








prices oflndonesian palm oil (FOBP01-1) significantly influence export prices of 
Indonesian palm oil (FOBP01). The signs of coefficients are positive, consistent with the 
hypotheses. In the short run, an increase (a decrease) one percent of one period lagged 
export prices include to export tariff oflndonesian palm oil would cause an increase (a 
decrease) 0.4 percent of export prices oflndonesian palm oil, and an increase ( a decrease) 
one percent of one period lagged world prices of palm oil would increase (decrease) 0. 7 
percent of export prices oflndonesian palm oil. In the long run, an increase ( a decrease) 
of one percent of one period lagged world prices of palm oil would cause a 1.2 percent 
increase (decrease) in export prices oflndonesian palm oil. Quantity export of 
Indonesian palm oil (EP01) and dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian 
palm oil and palm kernel oil (B1) are not significant. 
6.4.1.3. Equation 2: Export Prices oflndonesian Palm Kernel Oil. 
The results are stated in Table 6.3. In the short run and log run, the coefficients of one 
period lagged world prices of palm kernel oil(WPPK01_1) and one period lagged export 
prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil (FOBPK01_1) are significant and positive as 
hypothesized. In the short run, an increase ( a decrease) of one percent of one period 
lagged export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil would cause a 0.4 percent increase 
(decrease) in export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil, and an increase ( a decrease) 
one percent of one period lagged world prices of palm kernel oil would cause a 0.6 
percent increase (decrease) in export prices oflndonesian palm kernel oil. In the long 
run, an increase (a decrease) one percent of one period lagged world prices of palm 
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Table 6.3. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for Export 
Prices oflndonesian Palm Kernel Oil Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Estimated Standard T-Ratio P-Value 
Coefficient Coefficient Error 
Short Run Long Run 
INTERCEPT -0.0186 -0.0303 1.3320 -0.0140 0.989 
ONE PERIOD LAGGED WORLD 0.6126 0.9976 0.1833 3.3420··2 0.002**2 
PRICES OF PALM KERNEL OIL 
(US Dollar per Metric Ton) 
ONE PERIOD LAGGED EXPORT 0.3859 0.1408 2.7400**2 0.010**2 
PRICES OF INDONESIAN PALM 
KERNEL OIL (US dollar per Metric 
Ton) 
QUANTITY EXPORT OF -0.0197 -0.0321 0.0238 -0.8273 0.415 
INDONESIAN PALM KERNEL OIL 
(000 Metric Tons) 
DUMMY VARIABLE FOR EXPORT 0.0521 0.0848 0.0535 0.9734 0.338 
BAN POLICY OF INDONESIAN 




Number observations are 35 
v(a portion of the total desired adjustment in one period) is 0.6141 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
kernel oil would cause a 0.9 percent increase (decrease) in export prices oflndonesian 
palm kernel oil. Quantity export of Indonesian palm kernel oil (EPKO,) and dummy 
variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (B,) are not 
significant. 
6.4.1.4. Equation 3: Indonesian Domestic Cooking Oil Prices 
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The results are stated in Table 6.4. In the short run and log run, the coefficients of 
export prices oflndonesian palm oil (FOBPO,), dummy variable for BULOG activities in 
Indonesia (BULt), and export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil 
(ETR1) are significant. Consistent with the hypotheses the signs of coefficients are 
positive for export prices oflndonesian palm oil, and negative for dummy variable for 
. BULOG activities in Indonesia and export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil. 
In the short run: 1) an increase ( a decrease) of one percent of one period lagged 
export prices oflndonesian palm oil would cause an increase (a decrease) 0.5 percent of 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil price; 2) existence ofBULOG activities decreased 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil price; and 3) an increase ( a decrease) of one percent of 
export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil would decrease (increase) of 
Indonesian domestic cooking oil price by 0.2 percent. 
In the long run: 1) an increase ( a decrease) one percent of one period lagged 
export prices include to export tariff oflndonesian palm oil would cause an increase (a 
decrease) Indonesian domestic cooking oil price by 0.8 percent; 2) existence ofBULOG 
activities would decrease Indonesian domestic cooking oil price; and 3) an increase (a 
Table 6.4. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for 
Indonesian Domestic Cooking Oil Prices Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Coefficient Coefficient Error 
Short Run Long Run 
INTERCEPT -4.6138 -6.4828 2.8650 -1.6100 
ONE PERIOD LAGGED 0.2883 0.1889 1.5260 
INDONESIAN DOMESTIC 
COOKING OIL PRICES (US Dollar 
per Metric Ton) 
EXPORT PRICES OF INDONESIAN 0.5344 0.7509 0.2513 2.1270*1 
PALM OIL (US dollar per Metric 
Ton) 
EXPORT PRICES OF INDONESIAN 0.8938 1.2559 0.4594 1.9450 
PALM KERNEL OIL (US dollar per 
Metric Ton) 
DUMMY V ARlABLE FOR BULOG -0.2274 -0.3195 0.1029 -2.2100*1 
ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA 
EXPORT T ARlFF RATES OF -0.2161 -0.3036 0.0725 -2.9820**2 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL AND 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Percent) 
R-SQUARE 0.5319 
Note: 
Number observations are 35 
v(a portion of the total desired adjustment in one period) is 0.7117 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 









decrease) one percent of export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil 
would decrease (increase) Indonesian domestic cooking oil price by 0.3 percent. 
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One period lagged Indonesian domestic cooking oil prices ( DCOP1-1) and export prices 
include to export tariff oflndonesian palm kernel oil (FOBPKO,) are not significant. 
6.4.2. Malaysian Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil 
The Malaysian model (six equations; Figure 6.2.) has 35 observations with five 
exogenous variables (world prices of palm oil in Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton; 
exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit-US dollar; export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil; dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil; and world prices of palm kernel oil in Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton) and 
six endogenous variables (export prices of Malaysian palm oil in Malaysian Ringgit per 
metric ton; Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil in Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton; Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm kernel oil in Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton; Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches in Malaysian Ringgit per metric 
ton; export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil in Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton; and 
Malaysian domestic prices of palm kernel in Malaysian Ringgit per metric ton). 
6.4.2.1. The System of Simultaneous Model 
The results for the system are stated in Table 6.5. By choosing at P = 0.05 level 
And P = 0.01 level, the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the variables in 
Malaysia simultaneous equation model are zero is rejected which the Chi-Square with 12 
d.£ P-Value (or Wald Test) is 0.000 and R-Square is 0.9999. 
Table 6.5. The Results of System Malaysian Simultaneous Equation Model by Using 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
System R-Square 0.9999 
Test of the Overall Significance 317.43**2 
Chi-Square with 17 d.f, P-Value 0.000**2 
Note: 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
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6.4.2.2. Equation 1: 
The results for Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches are stated in 
Table 6.6. The coefficient of Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil (PCPOt) is 
significant. The sign of the coefficient is positive as hypothesized. An increase ( a 
decrease) of one percent in Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil would cause a 
0.9 percent increase (decrease) in Malaysian domestic prices of fresh fruit bunches. 
Malaysian domestic prices of palm kernel (PP Kt) and crude palm kernel oil (PCPKOt) 
are not significant. 
6.4.2.3. Equation 2: 
The results for Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil are stated in Table 
6. 7. The coefficients of export prices of Malaysian palm oil (FMPO,), exchange rate 
Malaysian Ringgit-US dollar (EXCMt), and export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil (ETR1) are significant. The coefficient signs of export prices of 
Malaysian palm oil and export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil are 
positive; their signs are the same signs as the hypotheses. The sign of exchange rate 
Malaysian Ringgit-US dollar is negative, this sign not consistent with the hypothesis. 
An increase (a decrease) of one percent in export prices of Malaysian palm oil 
caused a 0.96 percent increase (decrease) in Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm oil. 
An increase ( a decrease) of one percent in export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil would cause a 0.03 percent an increase (a decrease) in Malaysian 
Table 6.6. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for 
Malaysian Domestic Prices of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT -5.1224 0.0938 -54.6100 
MALAYSIAN DOMESTIC PRICES 0.9238 0.0069 133.0000**2 
OF CRUDE PALM OIL (CPO) 
(Malaysian Ringgit per Metric Ton) 
MALAYSIAN DOMESTIC PRICES 0.0619 0.1090 0.5676 
OF PALM KERNEL (PK) (Malaysian 
Ringgit per Metric Ton) 
MALAYSIAN DOMESTIC PRICES 0.0879 0.1042 0.8435 
OF CRUDE PALM KERNEL OIL 




Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 







Table 6.7. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for 
Malaysian Domestic Prices of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT 0.5678 0.2115 2.6850 
EXPORT PRICES OF MALAYSIAN 0.9640 0.0287 33.6200**2 
PALM OIL (Malaysian Ringgit per 
Metric Ton) 
EXCHANGE RATE RINGGIT -0.1180 0.0330 .3.5790**2 
MALAYSIA-US DOLLAR 
(Malaysian Ringgit per US Dollar) 
EXPORT TARIFF RATES OF 0.0397 0.0084 4.7360**2 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL AND 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Percent) 
DUMMY VARIABLE FOR EXPORT 0.0256 0.0160 1.6000 
BAN POLICY OF INDONESIAN 




Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 









domestic prices of crude palm oil. Dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian 
palm oil and palm kernel oil (Bt) is not significant but is positive as expected. 
6.4.2.4. Equation 3: 
The results for Malaysian domestic prices of palm kernel are stated in Table 6.8. 
The coefficient for export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil (FMPKOt) is significant 
and positive as hypothesized. An increase (a decrease) of one percent in export prices 
Malaysian palm kernel oil would cause a 1.2 percent an increase ( a decrease) in 
Malaysian domestic prices of palm kernel. The exchange rate (EXCMt) , export tariff 
rate for Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (ETRt) , and dummy variable for the 
export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (Bt) are not significant. 
6.4.2.5. Equation 4: 
The results for Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm kernel oil are stated in 
Table 6.9. The coefficient of export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil (FMPKO,) is 
significant and positive as hypothesized. An increase (a decrease) of one percent of 
export prices of Malaysian palm kernel could cause a 1.3 percent an increase ( a decrease) 
in Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm kernel oil. Exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit-
US dollar (EXCMt) , export tariff rates oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (ETR,), 
and dummy variable for export ban policy oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil (B,) 
are not significant. 
Table 6.8. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for 
Malaysian Domestic Prices of Palm Kernel (PK) Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT -2.5504 1.2140 -2.1000 
EXPORT PRICES OF MALAYSIAN 1.2494 0.1711 7.3040**2 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Malaysian 
Ringgit per Metric Ton) 
EXCHANGE RATE RlNGGIT -0.2519 0.1335 -1.8870 
MALAYSIA-US DOLLAR 
(Malaysian Ringgit per US Dollar) 
EXPORT TARIFF RATES OF 0.0001 0.0178 0.0057 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL AND 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Percent) 
DUMMY V ARlABLE FOR EXPORT 0.0455 0.0279 1.6290 
BAN POLICY OF INDONESIAN 




Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 








Table 6.9. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for 
Malaysian Domestic Prices of Crude Palm Kernel Oil (CPKO) Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio P-Value 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT -1.9736 1.0990 -1.7950 0.082 
EXPORT PRICES OF MALAYSIAN 1.2635 0.1548 8.1650··2 0.000··2 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Malaysian 
Ringgit per Metric Ton) 
EXCHANGE RATE RINGGIT -0.1651 0.1206 -1.3690 0.181 
MALAYSIA-US DOLLAR 
(Malaysian Ringgit per US Dollar) 
EXPORT TARIFF RATES OF -0.0126 0.0161 -0.7826 0.440 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL AND 
PALM KERNEL OIL (Percent) 
DUMMY VARIABLE FOR EXPORT 0.0322 0.0249 12950 0.205 
BAN POLICY OF INDONESIAN 




Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
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6.4.2.6. Equation 5: 
The results for export prices of Malaysian palm oil are stated in Table 6.10. The 
coefficient of world prices of palm oil (WPOMt) is significant and positive as 
hypothesized. An increase ( a decrease) of one percent in the world price of palm oil 
would cause a 1.0 percent increase (decrease) in export prices of Malaysian palm oil. 
6.4.2.7. Equation 6: 
The results for export prices of Malaysian palm kernel oil are stated in Table 6.11. 
The coefficient of world prices of palm kernel oil (WPKOMt) is significant and positive 
as hypothesized. An increase (a decrease) one percent world price of palm oil would 
cause a 0.9 percent increase (decrease) in export prices of Malaysian palm oil. 
6.4.3. Summary of Empirical Results 
From above explanations, it concludes that: 1) export prices oflndonesian palm 
oil and palm kernel oil follow the lagged world prices and the partial adjustment model 
appears appropriates; 2) export prices oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil were 
not influenced by quantity exported; 3) export prices oflndonesian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil were not influenced by the export ban policy; 4) The Indonesian domestic 
cooking oil price was influenced by export price of palm oil, BULOG, and export tariff 
rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil; 5) Indonesian logistic agency, BULOG, effectively 
decreased domestic cooking oil prices; 6) increased Indonesian export tariff rates on palm 
oil and palm kernel oil decreased domestic cooking oil prices; and 7) Indonesian 
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Table 6.10. Estimated Coeffi~ients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for Export 
Prices of Malaysian Palm Oil Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio P-Value 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT -0.4855 0.1195 -4.0610 0.000 
WORLD PRICES OF PALM OIL 1.0395 0.0159 65.3900''2 0.000··2 
(Malaysian Ringgit per Metric Ton) 
R-SQUARE 0.9924 
Note: 
Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
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Table 6.11. Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, T-Ratios, and P-Values for Export 
Prices of Malaysian Palm Kernel Oil Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Standard T-Ratio P-Value 
Coefficient Error 
INTERCEPT l.0411 0.5054 2.0600 0.047 
WORLD PRICES OF PALM 0.8699 0.0651 13.3700**2 0.000**2 




Number observations are 36 
10ne asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level 
2Two asterisks denote significance at the one percent level 
domestic cooking oil price was not influenced by its lagged price and export prices of 
palm kernel oil 
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For Malaysia, 1) the Malaysian domestic price of fresh fruit bunches was 
influenced by its domestic price of crude palm oil; 2) its domestic price of palm kernel 
and crude palm kernel oil did not influence the price of fresh fruit bunches; 3) Malaysian 
domestic prices of crude palm oil, palm kernel, and crude palm kernel oil were influenced 
by the export prices of palm oil and palm kernel oil; 4) exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit-
US dollar only influenced domestic price of crude palm oil; 5) Indonesian export tariff 
rates palm oil and palm kernel oil influenced Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm 
oil; 6) the Indonesian export ban on palm oil and palm kernel oil did not influence 
Malaysian's palm oil and palm kernel oil domestic prices; and 7) Malaysian export prices 
of palm oil and palm kernel oil closely followed world prices. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis began in February 1997 in Thailand. The 
Thailand government was failed to peg the Baht (Thailand's currency) against US dollar. 
Baht was allowed to float freely against US dollar and decreased 20 percent. Baht's drop 
triggered and dispersed the financial crisis to Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Social disruptions, decreases in output, decreases in income, massive job losses, 
and increased inflation were resulted. Increasing food prices became major issues. Palm 
oil is an important source for cooking oil in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia, palm 
oil is one of the nine essential commodities. Palm oil (cooking oil) became an important 
policy focus in Indonesia when its prices increased 80 to 134 percent in the crisis. The 
increasing price of cooking oil (palm oil) caused social turmoil and unrest in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian government set palm oil and palm kernel oil policies to stabilize and 
decrease the price of cooking oil. Export restrictions such as export ban and export tariffs 
for Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil were applied by the Indonesian government. 
In Malaysia, during the crisis the prices of its cooking oil were stable. 
The objectives of this research are: 1) to describe the world palm oil and palm 
kernel oil industry from 1997 to 1999 and the condition of palm oil and palm kernel oil 
industry in Indonesia and Malaysia during, and after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis; 
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2) to describe the political and economic policies that were applied by the Indonesian and 
Malaysian government to handle the crisis particularly in their palm oil and palm kernel 
oil industry in 1997 to 1999; and 3) to determine the impact of 1997-1998 Asian financial 
crisis on palm oil and palm kernel oil industry in Indonesia and Malaysia by evaluating 
the effect oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil policies on palm oil and palm kernel 
oil prices in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
For objective one, I found that world palm oil and palm kernel oil production 
varied between 14,304,000 to 20,277,000 metric ton palm oil in 1994-1999, and between 
1,861,000 to 2,518,000 metric tons for palm kernel oil. The world price of palm oil was 
from US $ 308.8 to US $ 723.8 per metric ton and from US $ 580.0 to US $ 780.0 per 
metric ton for palm kernel oil in 1994-1999. The world imports of palm oil increased 
from 10,614,000 to 13,581,000 metric tons in 1994-1999, while imports of palm kernel 
oil were from 896,000 to 1,260,000 metric tons. From 1994-1999, world export of palm 
oil increased from 10,760,000 to 13,527,000 metric tons, and world export palm kernel 
oil rose from 890,000 to 1,213,000 metric tons. 19,415,000 metric tons of world palm oil 
was disappearance in 1999 compare 14,803,000 metric tons in 1994 while the 
disappearance of world palm kernel oil increased from 1,946,000 to 2,554,000 metric 
tons. 
Malaysia and Indonesia are the world's first and second largest producers and 
exporters of palm oil and palm kernel oil. In 1999, Malaysia produced 10,554,000 metric 
tons of palm oil, while Indonesia produced 6,060,000 metric tons. Combined, Malaysia 
and Indonesia produced 82 percent of the world palm oil in 1999. 8,802,000 metric tons 
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of palm oil was exported by Malaysia in 1999 which it was 83.4 percent of Malaysian 
production and Indonesia exported 52.5 percent ofits production (3,183,000 metric tons). 
In Indonesian domestic of cooking oil, palm oil accounts for 80 percent, coconut 
oil is 11 percents, palm kernel oil is 7 percent, soybean oil is 0. 7 percent, and peanut oil is 
0.2 percent. Private companies controlled 46.4 percent of the production area in 
Indonesia followed by government estates at 18.9 percent. Sumatra Island is the largest 
palm oil harvested area with 87.8 percentage share of production followed by 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, and Java. In 1999, Indonesia exported 3,298,986.3 
metric tons palm oil; 597,842.4 metric tons palm kernel oil in with values of US $ 
1,114,242.6 for palm oil and US$ 347,974.6 for palm kernel oil. 
In Malaysia, palm oil trees are located in the Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and 
Sarawak. In 1999 there were 3,313,393 hectares planted areas of palm oil trees compare 
290,967 hectares in 1970. Private estates operated and managed 58.6 percent of palm oil 
area, 25.6 percent was by government organizations, 8.7 percent by smallholders and 7.1 
percent by a state scheme in 1999. In 1999, Malaysia produced 10,553,918 metric tons 
of crude palm oil (CPO); 3,025,690 metric tons of palm kernel (PK); 1,338,905 metric 
tons crude palm kernel oil (CPKO); and 1,624,134 metric tons of palm kernel cake 
(PKC). Exports of Malaysian palm oil earned RM 16,142.90 million in 1999, which the 
major importers were India and Pakistan. 
The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis caused a dilemma for Indonesia. 
Indonesia's real gross domestic product (real GDP) shrank by 19 percent. Indonesian 
economic growth was five percent in 1997 and -13 percent in 1998. Indonesia's inflation 
was 5.25 percent in 1997, and 56.25 percent in 1998. Gross domestic product per capita 
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(GDP per capita) dropped from US $ 1,000.00 to US $ 450.00. The exchange rate moved 
fromRp 2,207.00 per US dollar in 1996 to Rp 14,900.00 per US dollar in 1998. 
In completing objective 2, I found that Indonesia used numerous macroeconomic 
interventions as well policies directed toward the palm oil and palm kernel oil industry 
during the crisis while Malaysia did not. The Asian :financial crisis started in Indonesia in 
July 1997. To cope with the crisis, the Indonesian government: a) reduced budget outlays 
by canceling or delaying projects; b) requested aid from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); c) closed down and merged unviable banks; d) dismantled domestic monopolies; 
e) broke up the government monopolies; f) reduced the interest of the ruling families and 
its cronies; g) allowed private sector participation in infrastructure development; h) 
expanded the privatization program; i) eliminated the cartels; and j) increased the 
transparency of public sector activities. In Indonesia there was great unrest. Shops and 
supermarkets that were owned by ethnic Chinese business were robbed and burned in 
some areas. As the riot was dispersed in Jakarta, 1,180 people died. The crisis caused 
Mr. Soeharto to resign as the president. 
Malaysia also had economic and political problems during the 1997-1998 Asian 
fmancial crisis. Malaysia did not request a help from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in handling the problems. In the year of the crisis Malaysian's economic growth 
ofreal gross domestic product (real GDP) was 7.5 percent in 1997, and it was -6.5 
percent in 1998. Malaysian's inflation was 2.50 percent in 1997 and it was 5.50 percent 
in 1998. The Malaysian currency (Malaysian Ringgit) depreciated from RM 2.4832 to 
RM 4.5450 per US dollar. The Malaysian government dismissed Mr. Anwar Ibrahim as 
the deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia. In handling the crisis, the 
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Malaysian government tried to reduce the government spending. Several large projects 
were delayed or cancelled by the government. 
Because of the importance of palm oil and palm kernel oil for food security in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian government used several policy interventions during the crisis 
to control domestic cooking oil prices. The policies included: a) export tariffs; b) an 
export ban; c) government purchases and selling through BULOG (the National Logistic 
Agency); and d) activities of government production company PT Perkebunan Nusantara. 
The export tariff rates ranged from 2 to 60 percent. The export tariff on palm oil and 
palm kernel oil was established in September 1994. Indonesian policies moves during 
the 1997-1998 were frequent and included: a) prohibition of foreign investment in palm 
oil plantations; b) opening and developing new palm oil plantations in the eastern 
Indonesia; c) launching and expanding partnership of smallholders of palm oil in Eastern 
Indonesia; d) decreasing the export tariff rates of palm oil and palm kernel oil; e) 
applying the export restriction of palm oil and palm kernel oil by using quotas; f) 
increasing export tariff rates on palm oil and palm kernel oil; g) banning Indonesian palm 
oil and palm kernel oil for exports; g) allowing again foreign investment on palm oil 
plantations; h) prohibiting exports of some products of Indonesian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil; and i) stopping BULOG (the National Logistic Agency) distribution of palm 
oil and palm kernel oil from the government palm oil company PT Perkebunan 
Nusantara. 
In Malaysia during the crisis 1997-1998, the Malaysian government did not 
change and/or apply any specific policies for its palm oil and palm kernel oil industry 
since Malaysia did not have a big problem with rapidly using domestic cooking oil 
pnces. The export, revenues, and its domestic prices of Malaysian palm oil and palm 
kernel oil increased during the crisis. 
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To meet objective 3, the impacts of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis on the 
Indonesian, and Malaysian palm oil and palm kernel oil industries were estimated using 
two systems of equations. The empirical results show that: 1) export prices oflndonesian 
palm oil and palm kernel oil follow the lagged world prices and the partial adjustment 
model appears appropriates; 2) export prices oflndonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil 
were not influenced by quantity exported; 3) export prices oflndonesian palm oil and 
palm kernel oil were not influenced by the export ban policy; 4) the Indonesian domestic 
cooking oil price was influenced by export price of palm oil, BULOG, and export tariff 
rate on palm oil and palm kernel oil; 5) Indonesian logistic agency, BULOG, effectively 
decreased domestic cooking oil prices; 6) increased Indonesian export tariff rates on palm 
oil and palm kernel oil decreased domestic cooking oil prices; and 7) Indonesian 
domestic cooking oil price was not influenced by its lagged price and export prices of 
palm kernel oil 
For Malaysia, 1) the Malaysian domestic price of fresh fruit bunches was 
influenced by its domestic price of crude palm oil; 2) its domestic price of palm kernel 
and crude palm kernel oil did not influence the price of fresh fruit bunches; 3) Malaysian 
domestic prices of crude palm oil, palm kernel, and crude palm kernel oil were influenced 
by the export prices of palm oil and palm kernel oil; 4) exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit-
US dollar only influenced domestic price of crude palm oil; 5) Indonesian export tariff 
rates palm oil and palm kernel oil influenced Malaysian domestic prices of crude palm 
oil; 6) the Indonesian export ban on palm oil and palm kernel oil did not influence 
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Malaysian's palm oil and palm kernel oil domestic prices; and 7) Malaysian export prices 
of palm oil and palm kernel oil closely followed world prices. 
To summarize, from 1997 to 1999, world production of palm oil and palm kernel 
oil increased 7.4 percent per year, world imports of palm oil and palm kernel oil 
increased 7.4 percent per year, world exports of palm oil and palm kernel oil increased 
7.2 percent per year, and the disappearance of world palm oil and palm kernel oil 
increased 5.3 percent per year. In Indonesia, during the crisis in 1998, production and 
exports of palm oil and palm kernel oil were the low compared to 1997 and 1999. 
However the number of oil palm plantations and palm oil area harvested increased. The 
Indonesian government used export tariff rates and BULOG agency for its palm oil and 
palm kernel oil to cope with the domestic crisis while the Malaysian government did not. 
In Indonesia the export tariff rate and BULOG were effective in reducing and stabilizing 
domestic cooking oil prices. For Malaysia, Indonesian export tariff rates and the export 
ban on Indonesian palm oil and palm kernel oil did not affect domestic prices of 
Malaysian palm oil and palm kernel oil. 
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APPENDIXES 
Table A-1. Processed Palm Oil (PPO) Category 
Processed Palm Oil (PPO) Category 
Crude Palm Olein 
Crude Palm Stearin 
Neutralised Palm Oil 
Neutralised Palm Olein 
Bleached Palm Oil 
NB Palm Olein 
NB Palm Oil 
NBD Palm Oil 
RBDPalmOil 
NBD Palm Stearin 
RBD Palm Stearin 
NBD Palm Olein 
RBD Palm Olein 
Palm Acid Oil 
Palm Fatty Acid Distillate 
Cooking Oil/Double Olein 
RBD Hydrogenated Palm Oil 
Hydrogenated Palm Fatty Acid 
RBD Hydrogenated Palm Olein 
Hydrogenated Palm Olein 
RBD Hydrogenated Palm Stearin 
Hydrogenated Palm Stearin 
Hydrogenated Palm Oil 
Hydrogenated Palm Fatty Acid 
Distillate 
RBD Hydrogenated Stearin Flake 
Refined Palm Oil 
Distilled Palm Oil 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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Table A-2. Processed Palm Kernel Oil (PPKO) Category 
Processed Palm Kernel Oil (PPKO) Category 
RBD Palm Kernel Oil 
RBD Palm Kernel Olein 
RBD Palm Kernel Stearin 
RBDH Palm Kernel Oil 
RBDH Palm Kernel Olein 
RBDH Palm Kernel Stearin 
NBDH Palm Kernel Olein 
NBD Palm Kernel Stearin 
NBD Palm Kernel Olein 
NBD Palm Kernel Stearin 
NB Palm Kernel Olein 
NB Palm Kernel Stearin 
N Palm Kernel Olein 
Palm Kernel Fatty Acid 
Palm Kernel Acid Oil 
Hydrogenated Palm Kernel Oil 
Hydrogenated Palm Kernel Olein 
Hydrogenated Palm Kernel Stearin 
Hydrogenated Palm Kernel Fatty Acid 
Neutralised Palm Kernel Stearin 
Source: Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority, 1999 
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Table A-3. Export Volume and Value of Malaysian Palm Oil by Destination, 
1998-1999 
Destination 1998 1999 
Volume Value Volume 
189 
Value 
(Metric Tons) (RM Million) (Metric Tons) (RM Million) 
EU 1,089,074 2,418.8 1,099,056 1,683.1 
EUROPE 77,842 178.7 88,790 130.5 
N.AMERICA 123,282 252.7 135,635 195.5 
LATIN 
AMERICA 75,409 175.7 43,763 61.5 
MIDDLE 999,228 2,381.2 1,249,198 2,067.4 
EAST 
AFRICA 309,296 663.2 400,455 570.9 
OCEANIA 110,447 251.3 101,810 180.4 
EAST ASIA 1,546,434 3,751.6 1,507,395 2,511.5 
ASEAN 423,516 988.5 605,067 1,008.0 
WEST ASIA 2,698,871 6,556.5 3,653,111 5,929.9 
Bangladesh 64,884 157.8 55,471 89.0 
Cambodia 1,892 5.2 10,532 20.7 
India 1,361,973 3,380.0 2,376,955 · 3,855.5 
Maldives 16 0.0 0 0.0 
Myanmar 203,638 506.9 139,800 235.5 
Nepal 498 0.8 400 0.9 
Pakistan 1,020,097 2,403.0 1,020,845 1,651.5 
Sri Lanka 45,873 102.9 49,108 76.8 
OTHERS 11,528 32.5 29,249 79.6 
TOTAL 7,464,925 17,650.7 8,913,508 14,418.1 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table A-4. Export Volume and Value of Malaysian Palm Kernel Oil by Destination, 
1998-1999 
Destination 1998 1999 
Volume Value Volume Value 
(Metric Tons) (RM Million) (Metric Tons) (RM Million) 
EU 128,858 352.0 148,273 394.2 
Austria 78 0.2 0 0.0 
Belgium 1,224 3.5 72 0.3 
Denmark 15,745 46.5 18,626 54.4 
Finland 0 0.0 297 1.1 
France 20 0.9 154 0.5 
Germany 0 0.0 2,754 5.8 
Greece 980 3.2 1,850 5.8 
Ireland 203 0.7 110 0.4 
Italy 1,926 5.9 4,903 14.1 
Netherlands 91,169 241.7 103,872 269.7 
Spain 1,740 4.9 2,034 5.1 
Sweden 5,113 16.5 3,909 12.4 
U.Kingdom 10,661 27.8 9,693 24.6 
EUROPE 1,954 6.1 7,505 22.1 
N.AMERICA 95,116 · 272.7 125,274 336.5 
Canada 1,070 2.8 1,256 2.9 
USA 94,047 269.9 124,018 333.7 
LATIN 
AMERICA 24,095 68.2 10,838 31.0 
MIDDLE EAST 55,816 163.8 63,516 186.7 
AFRICA 34,224 90.8 29,410 79.7 
OCEANIA 7,116 20.9 8,910 27.1 
EAST ASIA 72,900 197.8 93,749 253,7 
ASE AN 6,311 15.8 31,203 82.6 
WEST ASIA 32,052 69.5 24,362 59.3 
OTIIERS 4,018 12.2 6,854 21.2 
TOTAL 462,459 1,269.8 549,893 1,494.1 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table A-5. Export Volume and Value of Malaysian Palm Kernel Cake by Destination, 
1998-1999 
Destination 1998 1999 
Volume Value Volume Value 
(Metric Tons) (RM Million) (Metric Tons) (RM Million) 
EU 1,029,729 187.1 1,097,072 204.1 
Germany 98,115 14.6 18,832 4.4 
Italy 4,199 0.9 0 0.0 
Netherlands 907,168 168.0 1,072,240 198.4 
Portugal 5,882 1.0 0 0.0 
U. Kingdom 14,365 2.7 6,000 1.2 
EAST ASIA 187,272 31.1 140,420 25.1 
WEST ASIA 0 0.0 16 0.0 
TOTAL 1,217,001 218.2 1,245,493 230.7 
Source: Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2000 
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Table A-6. The Economic Growth of Indonesia 1995-1999 
Period Economic Growth 































Source: Bank Indonesia 
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Table A-7. The Inflation Rate in Indonesia 1995-1999 
Period Inflation Rate 































Source: Bank Indonesia 






















































Source: Bank Indonesia 




















































Table A-9. The Exchange Rate oflndonesia, January 1995-December 1999 
Month, Year Exchange Rate 




























Table A-9. Continued 
Month, Year Exchange Rate 










































Source: Badan Pusat Statistik 
Exchange Rate 















Table A-10. Unemployment with Education in Indonesia for 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
Educational 
Accomplishment 
Under Primary School 
Primary School 
Junior High School 














Source: Badan Pusat Statistik, The BPS Web Site 
1998 1999 










Table A-11. The Economic GrowthofMalaysia 1995-1999 
Period Economic Growth 































Source: Bank Indonesia 
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Table A-12. The Inflation Rate in Malaysia 1996-1999 
Period Inflation Rate 

























Source: Bank Indonesia 
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Table A-13. The Exchange Rate in Malaysia, 1995 -1999 
Month, Year Exchange Rate 




























Table A-13. Continued 
Month, Year Exchange Rate 










































Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
Exchange Rate 















Table A-14. Export Duty on Palm Oil Products in Malaysia, January 1997 to December 
1997 
Month 
CPO PPO PPO Category 
GP Duty GP Duty I II III IIIA IV 
January 1,297.63 169.29 1,320.06 176.02 38.16 30.06 26.01 21.96 Nil 
February 1,236.32 150.89 1,348.46 184.53 32.99 24.04 19.57 15.09 Nil 
March 1,236.32 150.89 1,376.19 192.85 34.25 24.46 19.57 14.68 Nil 
April 1,426.83 208.05 1,433.50 210.05 58.33 46.83 21.07 15.33 Nil 
May 1,325.00 177.50 1,425.01 207.50 46.87 35.62 10.00 4.38 Nil 
June 1,277.50 163.25 1,437.90 211.37 41.34 29.71 23.89 18.07 Nil 
July 1,333.82 180.15 1,424.62 207.38 47.77 36.53 30.91 25.29 Nil 
August 1,285.50 165.65 1,414.98 204.49 41.83 30.88 25.40 19.94 Nil 
September 1,250.00 155.00 1,352.98 185.89 34.63 25.55 21.00 16.46 Nil 
October 1,274.50 162.35 1,383.60 195.08 38.59 28.58 23.58 18.57 Nil 
November 1,274.50 162.35 1,514.85 234.46 49.67 35.72 28.75 21.78 Nil 
December 1,381.20 194.36 1,627.55 268.26 71.01 53.68 45.02 36.36 Nil 
Note: 
CPO = crude palm oil 
PPO = processed palm oil 
GP = gazetted price 
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